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We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of
agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though
they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unani-
mous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group’s
share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for
small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims
to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is bet-
ter suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols
for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of
agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. For two groups with
arbitrary monotonic valuations, we give an efficient protocol that guarantees
envy-freeness up to one good for at least 1/2 of the agents in each group, and
prove that the 1/2 fraction is optimal. We also present other protocols that
make weaker fairness guarantees to more agents in each group, or to more
groups. Our protocols combine techniques from different fields, including
combinatorial game theory, cake cutting, and voting.
1. Introduction
Fair division is the study of how to allocate resources among agents with different pref-
erences so that agents perceive the resulting allocation as fair. This problem occurs in
a wide range of situations, from negotiating over international interests and reaching
divorce settlements [Brams and Taylor, 1996] to dividing household tasks and sharing
apartment rent [Goldman and Procaccia, 2014], and has been an important topic of
study in artificial intelligence, multiagent systems, and computational social choice in
the past decade [Endriss, 2010, Thomson, 2016, Markakis, 2017].
∗A preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence [Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018]. This version is substantially different, with several
new results (3.2, 3.3, 3.17 3.19, 3.23, 3.24, 4.7, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.9, 5.13, 5.14), improved proofs
for the old results (including a bug fix in the proof of Theorem 3.21), and an expanded related work
section.
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Two kinds of fairness criteria are common in the literature. The first, envy-freeness
(EF), means that each agent finds her share at least as good as the share of any other
agent. When allocating indivisible goods, envy-freeness is sometimes unattainable (con-
sider two agents quarreling over a single good), so it is often relaxed to envy-freeness up
to one good (EF1), which is always attainable [Lipton et al., 2004, Budish, 2011]. The
second kind, proportionality, stipulates that each agent should receive 1/n of her value
for the entire set of goods, where n is the number of agents. For similar reasons, this
cannot always be satisfied when goods are indivisible. A well-studied relaxation is max-
imin share fairness, which means that each agent finds his share at least as good as his
maximin share (MMS). This is the best share he can secure by dividing the goods into
n parts and getting the worst part. Even MMS fairness cannot always be guaranteed,
but at least a constant fraction of the MMS can [Procaccia and Wang, 2014].
Most works on fair division involve individual agents, each of whom has individual
preferences. Yet, in reality resources often have to be allocated among groups of agents,
such as families or countries. A good allocated to a group is shared among the group
members, who derive utility from the good. For example, when dividing real estate
among families, all members of a family enjoy their allocated house and backyard. In
international negotiations, the divided rights and settled outcomes are enjoyed by all
citizens of a country. When resources are allocated between different departments of
a university, all department members benefit from the whiteboards, open space and
conference rooms allocated to their department. Naturally, different group members
may have different preferences. The same share can be perceived as fair by one member
and unfair by another member of the same group. Ideally, we would like to find an
allocation that is considered fair by all agents in all groups. However, two recent works
show that this “unanimous fairness” might be too strong to be practical.
(a) Suksompong [2018] shows that when allocating indivisible goods among groups,
there might be no allocation that is unanimously EF1. Moreover, there might be no
division that gives all agents a positive fraction of their MMS. This impossibility occurs
even for two groups of three agents each.
(b) Segal-Halevi and Nitzan [2015] show that when allocating a divisible good (“cake”)
among groups, there might be no division that is unanimously envy-free and gives each
group a single connected piece, or even a constant number of connected pieces. In
contrast, with individual agents a connected envy-free division always exists [Stromquist,
1980].
What do groups do when they cannot attain unanimity? In democratic societies,
they use some kind of voting. The philosophy behind voting is that it is impossible to
satisfy everyone, so we should try to satisfy as many members as possible. Based on this
observation, we say that a division is h-democratic fair, for some fairness notion and for
some h ∈ [0, 1], if at least a fraction h of the agents in each group perceive it as fair.
In this paper we focus on allocating indivisible goods. We would like h, the fraction of
happy agents, to be as large as possible. We thus pose the following question:
Given a fairness notion, what is the largest h such that an h-democratic fair
allocation of indivisible goods can always be found?
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We study democratic fairness under three different assumptions on the agents’ valua-
tions. In the most general case, the agents can have arbitrary monotonic valuations on
bundles of goods. A more common assumption in the literature is that agents’ valua-
tions are additive—the value of a bundle is the sum of the values of the goods in the
bundle. We also study a special case of additive valuations in which agents’ valuations
are binary—each agent has a set of desired goods and her utility equals the number of
desired goods allocated to her group.
1.1. Results and techniques
Naturally, there is a trade-off between the strength of the fairness guarantee and the
fraction h of agents to which it can be guaranteed. In order to give maximum flexibility
to policy-makers, we study different fairness requirements of different strengths.
Initially (Section 3) we consider two groups with binary agents. We study a relax-
ation of envy-freeness that we call envy-freeness up to c goods (EFc), a generalization of
EF1. In this case, the trade-off curve is degenerate: for every constant c, it is possible
to guarantee 1/2-democratic EFc, and the fraction 1/2 is tight. The same holds for
proportionality up to c goods (PROP∗c), a relaxation of proportionality that we define
in Section 2, as well as for MMS fairness.
To get a more flexible trade-off curve, we study a relaxation of MMS called 1-out-of-c
MMS, which is the best share an agent can secure by dividing the goods into c subsets
and receiving the worst one. We prove that 1-out-of-c MMS can be guaranteed to at
least 1 − 1/2c−1 and at most 1 − 1/2c of the agents in both groups. We also study a
weaker relaxation called 1-of-best-c, which means that an agent’s utility is at least the
value of her c-th best good. It can be guaranteed to at least 1− 2/(2c + 1) and at most
1 − 1/2c of the agents in both groups. For c = 2, we show that 1-of-best-2 fairness can
be guaranteed to at least 3/5 and at most 2/3 of the agents in each group, improving
upon the upper bound for general c.
These positive results are attained by an efficient round-robin protocol, which we call
the Round-robin with Weighted Approval Voting (RWAV) protocol, where each group in
turn picks a good using weighted approval voting with carefully calculated weights. The
weights of agents who lose in early votes are increased in later votes. We believe this
weighted voting scheme can be interesting in its own right as a way to make fair group
decisions.
Next (Section 4) we consider two groups whose agents have arbitrary monotonic
valuations. We present an efficient protocol that guarantees EF1 to at least 1/2 of
the agents in each group (which is tight even for binary agents). When all agents are
additive, this protocol guarantees 1/2 of the MMS to 1/2 of the agents. This is tight:
one cannot guarantee more than 1/2 of the MMS to more than 1/3 of the agents. If we
weaken the requirement to 1-of-best-c fairness, we can make this guarantee to a larger
fraction of the agents—in particular, the same guarantees from Section 3 are valid for
additive agents.
The positive results here use a different protocol, which resembles the well-known “cut-
and-choose” protocol for dividing a cake between two agents. Despite the simplicity of
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Bin.+Add. valuations:
h
Positive-MMS &
1-of-best-2 fairness (0, 1/2]-fraction-MMS (1/2, 1]-fraction-MMS
(0, 1/3]
Yes (Thm. 3.17)
Yes (Cor. 4.6)
Bin: Yes (Cor. 4.6), Add: ?
(1/3, 1/2]
Bin: Yes (Cor. 4.6),
Add: No (Prop. 4.1)
(1/2, 3/5]
? Bin: ?, Add: No (Prop. 4.1)
(3/5, 2/3] ? (Conjecture 3.16)
(2/3, 1] No (Prop. 3.1)
Bin.+Add.+Mon. valuations:
h EFc (≡ PROP∗c) for c ≥ 1
(0, 1/2] Yes (Thm. 4.2)
(1/2, 1] No (Prop. 3.4)
h
1-of-best-c, c ≥ 3
Bin.+Add. valuations
1-out-of-c-MMS, c ≥ 3
Bin. valuations
(0, 1− 2/2c] Yes (Thm. 3.21)
(1− 2/2c, 1− 2/(2c + 1)] Yes (Thm. 3.17) ?
(1− 2/(2c + 1), 1− 1/2c] ?
(1− 1/2c, 1] No (Prop. 3.3)
Table 1: Summary of our results for two groups. The columns correspond to fairness
criteria. The rows correspond to ranges of h (the fraction of happy agents).
the protocol, we find the result important since, unlike previous results in this setting
[Manurangsi and Suksompong, 2017, Suksompong, 2018], our result holds for worst-case
instances with any number of agents in the groups and very general utility functions.
Finally (Section 5), we present three generalizations of our results to k ≥ 3 groups.
The first generalization has strong fairness guarantees: when all valuations are mono-
tonic, it guarantees EF2 to 1/k of the agents in all groups, and when all valuations are
binary, it guarantees both EF1 and MMS to 1/k of the agents in all groups (the factor
1/k is tight for EFc for any constant c, even when valuations are binary). However, the
running time of the protocol might be exponential.
The second generalization uses a polynomial-time protocol but has weaker fairness
guarantees: when valuations are additive, it guarantees approximations of proportion-
ality and MMS to 1/k of the agents, and when valuations are binary, it guarantees
MMS to 1/k of the agents. However, it does not guarantee EF1 or any relaxation of
envy-freeness.
The third generalization uses a variant of the RWAV protocol to guarantee 1-of-best-k
fairness (which implies a positive-factor approximation to the MMS) to at least 1/3 of
the agents in each group, for any number of groups with additive agents.
Some of our results and open questions are summarized in Table 1.
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1.2. Related work
Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a well-studied topic—see, for example, the survey
by Bouveret et al. [2016]. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the group fair division problem
is relatively new. We already mentioned the impossibility result of Suksompong [2018],
which is for worst-case agents’ utilities. Kyropoulou et al. [2019] explored the possibili-
ties and limitations of using EF1 as the fairness notion in the worst-case setting. On the
other hand, if the agents’ utilities are drawn at random from probability distributions,
Manurangsi and Suksompong [2017] showed that a unanimously envy-free allocation ex-
ists with high probability as the number of agents and goods grows. In our terminology,
unanimous fairness is equivalent to 1-democratic-fairness. Ghodsi et al. [2018] studied
fair division of rooms and rent among groups of tenants, using three notions of fairness
which they term strong, aggregate and weak—their “strong fairness” corresponds to our
1-democratic (unanimous) fairness, while their “weak fairness” means that at least one
agent is satisfied. A related model, in which a subset of public goods is allocated to
a single group of agents but the rest of the goods remain unallocated, has also been
investigated [Manurangsi and Suksompong, 2019].
Our group fairness notions differ from those studied, e.g., by Berliant et al. [1992],
Husseinov [2011], Todo et al. [2011], Benabbou et al. [2018] and Conitzer et al. [2019].
In their setting, goods are divided among individuals, each of whom is allocated an
individual share. The challenge comes from the requirement to eliminate envy, not only
between individuals, but also between subsets of agents. In our setting, the challenge is
that the goods are divided among groups, where all members of the same group consume
the same share. A share that is desirable for some group members might be undesirable
for other members of the same group. This motivates the use of social choice techniques
such as having each group vote on which goods to pick.
Group preferences are important in matching markets, too. For example, when match-
ing doctors to hospitals, usually a husband and a wife want to be matched to the
same hospital. This issue poses a substantial challenge to stable matching mechanisms
[Klaus and Klijn, 2005, 2007, Kojima et al., 2013].
The idea of satisfying a certain fairness notion for only a certain fraction of the popula-
tion, rather than unanimously, is sometimes used when unanimity is provably unattain-
able. For instance, Ortega [2018] proved that when two matching markets are merged
and a stable matching mechanism is run, it is impossible to attain monotonic improve-
ment for everyone, even though the improvement is attainable for at least half of the
population.
Our RWAV protocol is reminiscent of positional games [Hefetz et al., 2014]. In a
positional game, two players alternately pick elements, trying to occupy an entire set
from a given set family, or to occupy a single element in every set of that family. Famous
examples are Tic-Tac-Toe and Hex. In our RWAV protocol, the groups are the players,
and the sets of elements desired by the group members are the set families. In contrast
to positional games, in our case the set family of each group is different, so the “game”
is not zero-sum. In fact, our goal is to have both groups “win” simultaneously to the
extent possible. Our Theorem 3.14 is equivalent to one of the first results on positional
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games: the Erdo˝s-Selfridge theorem [Erdo˝s and Selfridge, 1973].
Approval voting is widely studied in political science—see, e.g., Brams et al. [2019]
for a recent application of approval voting to multi-winner elections.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Goods and agents
There is a set G = {g1, . . . , gm} of goods. A bundle is a subset of G. There is a set A
of agents. The agents are partitioned into k groups A1, . . . , Ak with n1, . . . , nk agents,
respectively. Let aij denote the jth agent in group Ai.
Each agent aij has a nonnegative utility uij(G
′) for each G′ ⊆ G. Denote by uij =
(uij(g1), . . . , uij(gm)) the utility vector of agent aij for individual goods. The agents’
utility functions are monotonic, i.e., uij(G
′′) ≤ uij(G′) for every G′′ ⊆ G′ ⊆ G and every
agent aij. A subclass of monotonic utilities is the class of additive utilities, i.e., for every
bundle G′ ⊆ G and every agent aij ∈ A, we have uij(G′) =
∑
g∈G′ uij(g). Sometimes
we will study a special case of additive utilities in which utilities are binary, i.e., each
agent either approves or disapproves each good. Since we will not engage in interpersonal
comparison of utilities, we may assume without loss of generality that in this case uij(g) ∈
{0, 1} for each i, j, g.1 For brevity, we will refer to agents with monotonic (resp., additive,
binary) valuations as monotonic agents (resp., additive agents, binary agents).
We allocate a bundle Gi ⊆ G to each group Ai. All goods should be allocated. The
goods are treated as public goods within each group, i.e., for every group i, the utility
of every agent aij is uij(Gi). We refer to a setting with agents partitioned into groups,
goods and utility functions as an instance.
2.2. Fairness notions
We begin by defining what it means for an allocation to be fair for a specific agent. We
start with envy-freeness.
Definition 2.1. For an agent aij and an integer c ≥ 0, an allocation is called envy-free
up to c goods (EFc) for aij if for all i
′ there is a set Ci′ ⊆ Gi′ with |Ci′ | ≤ c such that:
uij(Gi) ≥ uij(Gi′\Ci′).
In other words, one can remove the envy of aij toward group i
′ by removing at most c
goods from the group’s bundle. An EF0 allocation is also known as envy-free.
A second common fairness notion is proportionality.
1 Binary valuations are similar to dichotomous preferences, which are common both in theory
[Bogomolnaia et al., 2005] and in practice [Kurokawa et al., 2015]. However, in dichotomous prefer-
ences each agent assigns a utility of either 0 or 1 to each bundle rather than to each good (so they
are usually not additive).
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Definition 2.2. For an agent aij and an integer c ≥ 0, an allocation is called proportional
except c goods (PROP∗c) for aij if there exists a set C ⊆ G \Gi with |C| ≤ c such that:
uij(Gi) ≥ 1
k
uij(G \ C).
In other words, the agent feels that her family received its proportional share as long as
the best c goods not allocated to it are ignored.
A PROP∗0 allocation is also known as proportional.
Envy-freeness is stronger than proportionality in the following sense:
Lemma 2.3. If an allocation is EF1 for an additive agent, then it is also PROP∗(k − 1)
for that agent. When k = 2, the opposite implication is also true.
Proof. Denote by u the utility function of the agent and assume without loss of generality
that the agent is in group A1. EF1 implies that in each bundle Gi (for i ∈ {2, . . . , k})
there exists a subset Ci with |Ci| ≤ 1 such that u(G1) ≥ u(Gi \ Ci). Summing over
groups 2, . . . , k and adding u(G1) to both sides gives k · u(G1) ≥ u(G \ (C2 ∪ · · · ∪Ck)).
Let C := C2 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck. We have |C| ≤ k − 1, C ⊆ G \G1, and u(G1) ≥ 1ku(G \ C), so
the allocation is PROP∗(k − 1) for the agent.2
When k = 2, PROP∗1 implies that u(G1) ≥ 12u(G\C) for some C ⊆ G2 with |C| ≤ 1.
This implies that u(G1) ≥ u(G \ (C ∪G1)) = u(G2 \C), so the allocation is EF1 for the
agent.
We remark that our PROP∗(k − 1) is slightly stronger than the PROP1 notion studied
by Conitzer et al. [2017]: we remove the k − 1 highest values in {u(g) | g ∈ G \ Gi},
while they remove k times the highest value in {u(g) | g ∈ G \ Gi}. Similarly, it is
stronger than previous approximations of proportionality considered by Conitzer et al.
[2017], Aziz et al. [2019], and Suksompong [2019].
We illustrate our fairness notions with the following example, which also shows that
the opposite implication of Lemma 2.3 does not hold when k > 2.
Example 2.4. Suppose there are k = 3 groups. Below, all valuations are for a specific
agent in group A1.
Consider first an allocation in which group A1 gets a single good worth 30, group
A2 gets four goods worth 20, and group A3 gets one good worth 10 (the total value of
all goods is 120). This allocation is PROP∗2 for the agent, since if we remove the two
most valuable goods not allocated to group A1 (two goods worth 20), the value of the
remaining goods is 80, and the value for G1 is more than 80/3. However, the allocation is
not EF1 or even EF2 for the agent, since after removing two goods from G2, the agent’s
value for the bundle is 40, and her value for G1 is less than 40. The allocation is also
not PROP∗1 for the agent, since removing any single good not allocated to A1 leaves a
value of at least 100, and the agent’s value for G1 is less than 100/3.
Consider an alternative allocation in which one good is taken from A2 and given to
A1. In the new allocation, the agent’s value for G1 is 50 and her value for G2 is 60. The
allocation is PROP∗0 and EF1 for the agent. However, it is still not EF0 (envy-free).
2 A similar proof shows that for every c ≥ 1, EFc implies PROP∗(c(k − 1)).
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Next, we define the maximin share and its relaxations.
Definition 2.5. Given an agent aij , the maximin share (MMS) of aij is the maximum,
over all partitions of G into k sets, of the minimum of the agent’s utilities for the sets
in the partition (below, (G′1, . . . , G
′
k) is any k-partition of G):
MMSkij(G) := max
G′
1
,...,G′
k
min(uij(G
′
1), . . . , uij(G
′
k))
An allocation (G1, . . . , Gk) is said to be MMS-fair for aij if uij(Gi) ≥ MMSkij(G).
Since MMS fairness is not always attainable, various approximations have been stud-
ied. We define, for each integer c ≥ k, the 1-out-of-c maximin share of aij as the
maximum, over all partitions of G into c sets, of the minimum of the agent’s utilities for
the sets in the partition (below, (G′1, . . . , G
′
c) is any c-partition of G):
MMScij(G) := max
G′
1
,...,G′c
min(uij(G
′
1), . . . , uij(G
′
c))
Definition 2.6 (relaxations of MMS). An allocation (G1, . . . , Gk) is said to be:
• 1-out-of-c MMS-fair for aij , if uij(Gi) ≥ MMScij(G).
• q-fraction-MMS-fair for aij, for some fraction q ∈ (0, 1), if uij(Gi) ≥ q ·MMSkij(G).
• 1-of-best-c for aij, for an integer c ≥ k, if uij(Gi) is at least the value of aij’s c-th
best good in G.
• positive-MMS-fair for aij , if MMSkij(G) > 0 implies uij(Gi) > 0 (equivalently, if it
is q-fraction-MMS-fair for some q > 0).
MMS fairness was introduced by Budish [2011] based on earlier concepts by Moulin
[1990]. Budish also considered its relaxation to 1-out-of-(n + 1) MMS. The notion 1-
out-of-c MMS is a special case of l-out-of-d MMS, recently defined by Babaioff et al.
[2017] and studied by Segal-Halevi [2018]. Fractional MMS fairness was introduced by
Procaccia and Wang [2014].
1-of-best-c fairness has not been considered before, as far as we are aware. It is
relevant for agents who are mainly interested in getting one of their top choices. While
it is a rather weak fairness notion, in our group setting it is useful when stronger fairness
notions are unattainable.
The following implications between the MMS approximations follow from their defi-
nitions (note that 1-of-best-k-fair also implies 1-of-best-c-fair for c ≥ k):
ր 1-out-of-c MMS-fair (c ≥ k)→ 1-of-best-c-fair (c ≥ k)
MMS-fair→ 1-of-best-k-fair → positive-MMS-fair
ց q-fraction-MMS-fair (q ∈ (0, 1)) ր
Proportionality is stronger than MMS in the following sense:
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Lemma 2.7. If an allocation among k groups is PROP∗(k − 1) for an additive agent,
then:
(a) It is also 1/k-fraction-MMS-fair for that agent (1/k is tight);3
(b) It is also 1-out-of-(2k − 1) MMS-fair for that agent (2k − 1 is tight);
(c) If the agent is binary, the allocation is also MMS-fair for that agent. Moreover,
MMS-fairness implies PROP∗(k − 1) for a binary agent.
Proof. Denote by u the utility function of the agent and assume without loss of generality
that the agent is in group A1.
(a) PROP∗(k − 1) implies that there exists a subset C with |C| ≤ k − 1 such that
u(G1) ≥ 1ku(G \ C). In any partition of G into k bundles, at least one bundle does
not contain any good in C. This bundle is contained in G \C. Therefore, the MMS
is at most u(G \ C) and u(G1) is at least 1/k of it.
To show that the factor 1/k is tight, assume that there are 2k − 1 goods with
u(g1) = · · · = u(gk) = 1 and u(gk+1) = · · · = u(g2k−1) = k. If the agent’s group gets
g1 and group i ≥ 2 gets {gi, gk+i−1}, the agent gets utility 1 and finds the allocation
EF1 (hence also PROP∗(k − 1)). However, the MMS is k, as can be seen from the
partition ({g1, . . . , gk}, {gk+1}, . . . , {g2k−1}).
(b) As above PROP∗(k − 1) implies u(G1) ≥ 1ku(G \ C). Since |C| ≤ k − 1, in any
partition of G into 2k− 1 bundles, at least k bundles do not contain any good in C.
The union of these bundles is contained in G \ C. By the pigeonhole principle, at
least one of these k bundles has utility at most 1ku(G \ C) which is at most u(G1).
Therefore, u(G1) is at least the 1-out-of-(2k − 1) MMS.4
To show that 2k − 1 is tight, consider the following allocation:
• Group A1 gets a single good worth k − 1;
• Each group A2, . . . , Ak gets one good worth k plus k − 1 goods worth 1 each
for our distinguished agent in group A1.
The allocation is EF1 (hence PROP∗(k − 1)) for the agent. However, the 1-out-of-
(2k − 2) MMS of the agent is k due to the following partition (note that in total,
there are 1 good worth k− 1, k− 1 goods worth k, and (k− 1)(k− 1) = k2− 2k+1
goods worth 1):
• Bundle 1 has the good worth k − 1 plus one good worth 1;
• Each of the k − 1 bundles 2, . . . , k has one good worth k;
• Each of the k − 2 bundles k + 1, . . . , 2k − 2 has k goods worth 1.
(c) Suppose the agent has pk + q desired goods, for some integers p ≥ 0 and q ∈
{0, . . . , k−1}. Both PROP∗(k − 1) and MMS-fairness require that the agent’s group
receives at least p of these goods, so the conditions are equivalent.
3 The implication EF1 → 1/k-fraction-MMS-fairness was proved concurrently and independently by
Amanatidis et al. [2018, Prop. 3.6].
4 A similar proof shows that for every c ≥ 1, PROP∗c implies 1-out-of-(c+ k)-MMS fairness.
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Unlike (c), the opposite implications of (a) and (b) do not hold even when k = 2 and
agents are binary.
Example 2.8. Assume that there are k = 2 groups and 6 goods for which all agents
have value 1. Then, an allocation is 1-out-of-3 MMS-fair for an agent iff the agent’s
value is at least 2, and it is 1/2-fraction-MMS fair for all agents iff each agent’s value is
at least 3/2 = 1.5; both these conditions can be satisfied for all agents by giving each
group at least two goods. However, an allocation is PROP∗1 for an agent iff the agent’s
value is at least 5/2 = 2.5. Hence, the only way to make the allocation PROP∗1 for all
agents is by giving each group exactly three goods.
The following diagram summarizes Lemmas 2.3 and 2.7.
ր 1/k-fraction-MMS-fair
EF1→ PROP∗(k − 1)↔ MMS-fair (for binary agents)
ց 1-out-of-(2k − 1) MMS-fair
Now we are ready to define our main group fairness notion:
Definition 2.9. For any given fairness notion, an allocation (G1, . . . , Gk) is said to be
h-democratic fair if it is fair for at least h · ni agents in group Ai, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We also refer to 1-democratic fairness as unanimous fairness.
3. Two Groups with Binary Valuations
This section considers the setting where there are two groups, the agents have additive
valuations, and each agent either desires a good (in which case her utility for the good
is 1) or does not desire it (in which case her utility is 0).
3.1. Negative results
Even in the special case of binary valuations, some fairness guarantees are unattainable.
Proposition 3.1. For any h > 2/3, there is a binary instance in which no allocation is
h-democratic positive-MMS-fair.
Proof. Suppose that there are three goods. Each group consists of three members, each
of whom has utility 0 for a unique distinct good and utility 1 for each of the other two
goods. Each agent has a positive MMS (1), but no allocation gives all agents a positive
utility.5
We now proceed to prove more general negative results. In binary instances, each
agent can be represented by two integers, which we denote here by r and s:
5 This negative result extends to groups with 3l members for every integer l ≥ 1. It does not hold when
the number of agents is not a multiple of 3. However, we do not address such cases in this paper, as
our goal is to develop division algorithms that hold regardless of the number of agents.
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• r is the number of goods that the agent finds desirable;
• s is the number of desirable goods that the agent needs to get so that the allocation
is considered fair for that agent.
Specific fairness requirements define s as a function of r. For example, with two groups:
• EFc and PROP∗c both mean that s = ⌊(r − c + 1)/2⌋. In particular, EF1 and
PROP∗1 mean that s = ⌊r/2⌋.
• 1-out-of-c MMS means s = ⌊r/c⌋. So MMS-fairness is equivalent to EF1 and
PROP∗1.
• 1-of-best-c fairness means that s = 1 whenever r ≥ c.
• Positive-MMS means that s = 1 whenever r ≥ 2 (equivalent to 1-of-best-2).
We prove a negative result for general r and s, and then use it to derive negative results
for specific fairness requirements.
Proposition 3.2. Let r, s be integers such that r ≥ s ≥ 1, and let
MaxH(r, s) =
{
0 when r ≤ 2s− 1;
1
2r
∑r
i=s
(
r
i
)
when r ≥ 2s.
For any h > MaxH(r, s), there exists a binary instance with two groups in which no
allocation is h-democratic fair, where each agent desires exactly r goods and needs s
desirable goods in order to consider the allocation fair.
Proof. For the case r ≤ 2s − 1, consider an instance with r goods, where all agents in
both groups desire all goods and needs s desirable goods to be happy. At least one group
will get at most r/2 < s goods, so all of its members will be unhappy.
For the case r ≥ 2s, consider an instance with 2m goods, for some m ≫ r. In each
group there are
(2m
r
)
members, each of whom wants a distinct subset of r goods and
needs s desirable goods to be happy. At least one group will get at most m goods. We
may assume that the group receives exactly m goods; if the group receives fewer than
m goods, the fraction of happy agents can only decrease. In this group, the fraction of
happy agents will be at most: ∑r
i=s
(m
i
) · ( mr−i)(2m
r
) .
When m ≫ r, the numerator is approximately ∑ri=s mii! · mr−i(r−i)! = ∑ri=s mri!(r−i)! and the
denominator is approximately (2m)
r
r! =
2rmr
r! . Therefore when m → ∞ the expression
approaches 12r
∑r
i=s
(r
i
)
.
For illustration, some values of MaxH(r, s) are shown in Table 2.
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r ↓ s =⇒ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0.875 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0.938 0.688 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0.969 0.813 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0.985 0.891 0.657 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0.993 0.938 0.774 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 0.997 0.966 0.856 0.637 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 0.999 0.982 0.911 0.747 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 1 0.991 0.947 0.829 0.624 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Some values of MaxH(r, s). The italics at (r, s) = (2, 1) denotes that this upper
bound is not tight—Proposition 3.1 shows an upper bound of 2/3 in this case.
We do not know if the other bounds are tight.
Proposition 3.3. For any integer c ≥ 2 and h > 1−1/2c, there is a binary instance with
two groups in which no allocation is h-democratic 1-of-best-c fair (hence no allocation is
h-democratic 1-out-of-c MMS-fair).
Proof. Apply Proposition 3.2 with r = c and s = 1. Then MaxH(r, s) = 1− 12c · 1.
Note that for c = 2, 1-of-best-c is equivalent to positive-MMS, so Proposition 3.1 gives
a tighter upper bound of 2/3.
Proposition 3.4. For any constant integer c ≥ 1 and h > 1/2, there is a binary instance
with two groups in which no allocation is h-democratic PROP∗c / EFc.
Proof. Let l be a large positive integer. Apply Proposition 3.2 with r = 2l and s =
⌊(r − c+ 1)/2⌋ = l − ⌊c/2⌋. Then MaxH(r, s) = 1
22l
∑2l
i=l−⌊c/2⌋
(2l
i
)
. When l →∞, this
expression approaches 1/2 for any constant c.
3.2. Positive results
3.2.1. The RWAV protocol
Our positive results are attained with a protocol that we call Round-robin with Weighted
Approval Voting (RWAV). The top-level protocol is round-robin—the groups take turns
picking one good at a time. Formally:
While there are remaining goods:
• Group 1 picks a good;
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• Group 2 picks a good.
To attain the fairness guarantee, each group in its turn should pick its good using
weighted approval voting. It uses a weight function w : Z≥0×Z≥0 → [0, 1], which will be
specified later using a recurrence relation (see Table 3/bottom for some example values).
The group assigns to each member j a weight w(rj , sj), where:
• rj is j’s value for the remaining goods (the number of remaining goods that j
values at 1);
• sj depends on the chosen fairness criterion: it is the value that j should still get
in order to feel that the allocation is fair (the number of goods, from the set of
remaining goods that j values as 1, that its group should take so that the fairness
criterion is fulfilled for j).
Using the members’ weights, the group conducts an “approval voting” among the
remaining goods: each member votes for all the remaining goods he/she values as 1. The
total-weight of each good g is the sum of weights of all agents voting for g. The group
picks a good g with a maximum total-weight, breaking ties arbitrarily. To summarize,
here is the algorithm by which each group in its turn should pick a good:6
Group’s strategy for picking a good:
• Assign a weight w(r, s) to each group member who wants r of the remaining
goods and needs s of them to achieve fairness;
• For each remaining good g, calculate the sum of weights of all members who
want g, and pick a good with a maximum total-weight.
Example 3.5. Consider an instance with five goods, {v,w, x, y, z}, where the fairness
criterion is 1-out-of-2 MMS-fairness. Suppose that in the first turn, group 1 took v and
group 2 took w. Now it is again the turn of group 1. Assume that in group 1 there are
two agents: Alice, whose desired goods are {w, x}, and Bob, whose desired goods are
{w, x, y, z}:
• Alice has a single remaining desired good (x), her current value of group 1’s share
(v) is 0, and she needs a value of 1 to satisfy the fairness criterion. Therefore
rAlice = |{y}| = 1, sAlice = 1− 0 = 1, and her weight is w(1, 1) = 0.5 (Table 3).
• Bob has three remaining desired goods (x, y, z), his current value of group 1’s share
is 0, and he needs a value of 2 to satisfy the fairness criterion. Therefore rBob = 3,
sBob = 2, and his weight is w(3, 2) = 0.375.
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r ↓ | s→ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0.75 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0.875 0.375 0 0 0 0
4 1 0.938 0.625 0 0 0 0
5 1 0.969 0.782 0.313 0 0 0
6 1 0.985 0.876 0.548 0 0 0
7 1 0.993 0.931 0.712 0.274 0 0
8 1 0.997 0.962 0.822 0.493 0 0
9 1 0.999 0.98 0.892 0.658 0.247 0
10 1 1 0.99 0.936 0.775 0.453 0
B(r, s) for some r ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0. The boldfaced cells are the cells of B(r − 1, s(r))
where s(r) =
⌊
r
3
⌋
= the function corresponding to 1-out-of-3 MMS-fairness.
r ↓ | s→ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0
1 0 .500 0
2 0 .250 0 0
3 0 .125 .375 0
4 0 .063 .250 0 0
5 0 .031 .156 .313 0
6 0 .016 .094 .234 0 0
7 0 .008 .055 .164 .273 0
8 0 .004 .031 .109 .219 0 0
9 0 .002 .018 .070 .164 .246 0
10 0 .001 .010 .044 .117 .205 0
w(r, s) for some r ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0.
Table 3: Some values of B(r, s) and w(r, s). Compare to MaxH(r, s) in Table 2.
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We now specify the function w(r, s). We first define an auxiliary function B : Z×Z→
[0, 1] using the recurrence relation below:
B(r, s) :=


1 s ≤ 0;
0 0 < s and r < s;
min
[
1
2 [B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1)], B(r − 2, s − 1)
]
otherwise.
(1)
A closed-form expression of B(r, s) is derived in Appendix A. Table 3 shows some values.
Now w is defined by:
w(r, s) := B(r, s)−B(r − 1, s). (2)
Note that w(r, s) = 0 whenever s = 0; thus, members for whom the current allocation
is already fair do not affect the weighted voting. Similarly, w(r, s) = 0 whenever r = 0,
so members who do not value any of the remaining goods do not affect the voting either.
To demonstrate the operation of the protocol, we have implemented it in Python.7
An example run is shown in Appendix B.1.
3.2.2. Analysis of RWAV
RWAV provides a democratic fairness guarantee for various fairness criteria. A fairness
criterion is represented by an integer function s(r) that maps the total number of desired
goods of an agent (which we denoted above by r) to the number of desired goods this
agent should get in order to satisfy the fairness criterion (which we denoted above by
s). For example, for 1-out-of-3 MMS-fairness, this function is s(r) = ⌊ r3⌋.
Lemma 3.6. Given a fairness criterion represented by an integer function s(r), for
every group i ∈ {1, 2}, the RWAV protocol yields an allocation that is fair for at least a
fraction hi of the agents in group i, where:
h1 = inf
r=1,2,...
B(r, s(r));
h2 = inf
r=1,2,...
B(r − 1, s(r)).
Example 3.7. Suppose the chosen fairness criterion is 1-out-of-3 MMS-fairness. Then
h2 is the infimum of the sequence B(r − 1, ⌊ r3⌋), illustrated by the boldfaced cells in
Table 3. We show in Lemma A.11 that this infimum is B(2, 1) = 0.75, and in Lemma
A.2 that when s is fixed, B(r, s) is an increasing function of r. This implies h1 ≥ h2 (in
this example h1 = 0.875). Therefore, Lemma 3.6 implies that the allocation returned by
RWAV is 0.75-democratic 1-out-of-3 MMS-fair.
6We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to simplify the protocol.
7 https://github.com/erelsgl/family-fair-allocation
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To prove Lemma 3.6, we add to the protocol several steps in which each group
pays/receives fiat money to/from its members. We emphasize that these additional
steps are not needed in a practical implementation of the protocol—they are used only
in the analysis. We present the additional steps for group 1; the steps for group 2 are
analogous.
• Initialization: before the protocol starts, the balance of the group and the balance
of each member is initialized to 0. Then, each member j pays B(rj , sj) to its group,
so now j’s balance is −B(rj, sj) and the group balance is +
∑
j∈group 1B(rj , sj).
• After group 1 picks a good g, every member j who values g at 1 (and thus is
satisfied with the group’s choice) pays max[w(rj , sj), w(rj − 1, sj − 1)] to group 1.8
• After group 2 picks a good g, every member j who values g at 1 (and thus is
dissatisfied with the other group’s choice) receives w(rj , sj) from group 1.
Example 3.8 (Example 3.5 continued). Before the protocol starts, Alice has r = 2
and s = 1 so she pays B(2, 1) = 0.75, while Bob has r = 4 and s = 2 so he pays
B(4, 2) = 0.625. The balance of group 1 is 1.375.
In the first turn, Alice’s weight is w(2, 1) = 0.25 and Bob’s weight is w(4, 2) = 0.25.
Goods w and x both have the same total weight of 0.5, so group 1 picks one of them
arbitrarily, say w. Now, Alice pays max[w(2, 1), w(1, 0)] = max[0.25, 0] = 0.25 and Bob
pays max[w(4, 2), w(3, 1)] = max[0.25, 0.125] = 0.25, so group 1’s balance is now 1.875.
In the second turn, Alice has r = 1 and s = 0 so her weight is w(1, 0) = 0, and Bob
has r = 3 and s = 1 so his weight is w(3, 1) = 0.125. Suppose that group 2 picks x. Since
both Alice and Bob value x at 1, both agents receive their weight from the group—Alice
receives 0 and Bob receives 0.125. Group 1’s balance is now 1.75.
In the third turn, Alice’s weight is w(0, 0) = 0 and Bob’s weight is w(2, 1) = 0.25.
Goods y and z both have the same total weight of 0.25, so group 1 picks one of them
arbitrarily, say y. Now, Alice pays nothing (since y is not one of her desired goods),
while Bob pays max[w(2, 1), w(1, 0)] = max[0.25, 0] = 0.25. Group 1’s balance is now 2,
and the balance of both Alice and Bob is −1.
From here on, both Alice’s and Bob’s weights remain 0, so they do not pay nor receive
anything and do not affect the group’s vote; the group just picks arbitrary goods.
In the final allocation, Alice’s value is 1 and Bob’s value is 2, so 1-out-of-2-MMS is
satisfied for both of them.
To establish Lemma 3.6, we prove some auxiliary lemmas about the behavior of the
protocol with the additional steps.
Lemma 3.9. During the protocol, the balance of each agent j is always −B(rj, sj).
Proof. We prove the claim for members of group 1; the proof for group 2 is analogous.
The proof is by induction. The induction base is handled by the initialization step.
8In the conference version of this paper [Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018], we erroneously wrote
that such a member should always pay w(rj , sj).
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After group 2 picks a good g, the balance of each member who values g at 1 increases.
The new balance of each such member with parameters r and s is:
−B(r, s) + w(r, s) = −B(r − 1, s) by definition of w,
and indeed, for each such member, r drops by 1 while s remains unchanged. For each
member who values g at 0, both the balance and r, s do not change.
After group 1 picks a good g, the balance of each member who values g at 1 de-
creases. The new balance of each such member with parameters r and s is −B(r, s) −
max[w(r, s), w(r − 1, s − 1)]. For each such member, both r and s drop by 1, so we
have to prove that this new balance equals −B(r− 1, s− 1). We consider the two cases
relevant for the max operation:
Case 1: w(r, s) ≥ w(r − 1, s− 1). This implies:
B(r, s)−B(r − 1, s) ≥ B(r − 1, s− 1)−B(r − 2, s− 1) by definition of w
=⇒ B(r, s) +B(r − 2, s− 1) ≥ B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)
=⇒ B(r − 2, s− 1) ≥ 1
2
[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)]
since by (1), either B(r, s) = B(r − 2, s− 1) or B(r, s) = 1
2
[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)]
=⇒ B(r, s) = 1
2
[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)] by (1)
Then the new balance is:
−B(r, s)−w(r, s)
=− 2B(r, s) +B(r − 1, s) by definition of w
=− [B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)] +B(r − 1, s) substituting B(r, s) from above
=−B(r − 1, s − 1).
Case 2: w(r, s) ≤ w(r − 1, s− 1). This implies:
B(r, s)−B(r − 1, s) ≤ B(r − 1, s− 1)−B(r − 2, s− 1) by definition of w
=⇒ B(r, s) +B(r − 2, s− 1) ≤ B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)
=⇒ B(r − 2, s− 1) ≤ 1
2
[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)]
since by (1), either B(r, s) = B(r − 2, s− 1) or B(r, s) = 1
2
[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)]
=⇒ B(r, s) = B(r − 2, s− 1) by (1)
Then the new balance is:
−B(r, s)− w(r − 1, s − 1)
=−B(r, s)−B(r − 1, s − 1) +B(r − 2, s − 1) by definition of w
=−B(r − 2, s − 1)−B(r − 1, s − 1) +B(r − 2, s − 1) substituting B(r, s) from above
=−B(r − 1, s − 1).
This completes the proof.
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Lemma 3.10. For each group i, in each pair of consecutive turns in which group i picks
a good and then the other group picks a good, the balance of group i weakly increases.
Proof. We calculate the change in the balance of group i in a pair of turns in which group
i picks a good gi and then the other group picks a good g−i. The change in balance is
determined by the weights of three groups of agents, which we denote by:
• Di: agents who desire gi and do not care about g−i. Each agent j in this group
pays max[w(rj , sj), w(rj − 1, sj − 1)] ≥ w(rj , sj).
• D−i: agents who do not care about gi and desire g−i. Each agent in this group
receives w(rj , sj).
• D0: agents who desire both gi and g−i. Each agent in this group first pays
max[w(rj , sj), w(rj − 1, sj − 1)] and then receives w(rj − 1, sj − 1).
Each agent in D0 pays at least as much as he receives. Therefore, the total change in
the group balance after the two turns satisfies:
∆[Balance] ≥
∑
j∈Di
w(rj , sj)−
∑
j∈D−i
w(rj , sj).
Now, the group chose gi while g−i was still available, which means that the total weight
of gi is weakly larger:∑
j∈Di
w(rj , sj) +
∑
j∈D0
w(rj , sj) ≥
∑
j∈D−i
w(rj , sj) +
∑
j∈D0
w(rj , sj).
This means that ∆[Balance] ≥ 0, as desired.
Let us call a group member happy if the final allocation is fair according to this
member’s valuation function and the chosen fairness criterion. Otherwise the member
is unhappy.
Lemma 3.11. When the RWAV protocol ends, the balance of each group equals the
number of its happy members.
Proof. When the protocol ends, all agents have r = 0. For a happy member s = 0, while
for an unhappy member s > 0 so s > r. By the recurrence relation of B, for a happy
member B(r, s) = B(r, 0) = 1, while for an unhappy member B(r, s) = 0. By Lemma
3.9 the balance of each happy member is −1 and the balance of each unhappy member
is 0. Since all payments are between the group and its members, the group balance is
the negative of the sum of its members’ balances, which is exactly the number of happy
members.
Now we tie the knots and prove the main lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 3.6. We first prove that the initial balance of group i ∈ {1, 2} at its
first turn to pick a good is at least hi ·ni. This is obvious for group 1 since, by definition
of the initial payments, each member j initially pays the group B(rj , s(rj)), which is
at least h1. As for group 2, before its first turn it might have to pay to members who
wanted the first good which was picked by group 1. To each member j, group 2 has to
pay either 0 or w(rj , s(rj)). After than, the new net payment of each member is at least
B(rj, s(rj))− w(rj , s(rj)) = B(rj − 1, s(rj)), which is at least h2.
By Lemma 3.10, the balance of each group weakly increases from its first turn to
the end of the protocol, so the final balance of group i is at least hi · ni. Lemma 3.11
then implies that when RWAV ends, in each group i there are at least hi · ni happy
members.
Remark 3.12. For simplicity, we assumed in Lemma 3.6 that both groups have the
same fairness criterion. In general, however, each group i can use a different function
si(·) and get the corresponding guarantee regardless of the function s−i used by the
other group.
Remark 3.13. It is possible to obtain improved guarantees if, instead of picking goods
in deterministically alternating turns, we give the next turn to one of the two groups at
random. See Appendix C for details.
3.3. 1-of-best-c fairness
We now use Lemma 3.6 to obtain specific fairness guarantees, starting with 1-of-best-c
fairness. Proposition 3.3 gives an upper bound of h ≤ 1− 1/2c. The following theorem
almost matches this bound.
Theorem 3.14. For every c ≥ 2, RWAV can guarantee 1-of-best-c fairness to at least
1− 1/2c−1 of the members in both groups (and to at least 1− 1/2c of the members in the
first group).
Proof. 1-of-best-c means that every agent with r ≥ c desired goods must get s ≥ 1
goods. By Lemma 3.6, we can guarantee this condition to at least B(c − 1, 1) of the
agents in both groups (and at least B(c, 1) of the agents in the first group). It remains
to prove that B(c, 1) = 1− 1/2c. The proof is by induction on c. For c = 0, B(0, 1) = 0
by the boundary condition of B. Now assume that c > 0 and that the claim is true for
c− 1. Then, by the recurrence (1) defining B:
B(c, 1) = min
[
(B(c− 1, 1) +B(c− 1, 0))/2, B(c− 2, 0)]
= min
[
(1− 1/2c−1 + 1)/2, 1] (using the induction assumption)
= 1− 1/2c.
Example 3.15. Let c = 5 and suppose that each agent in group 1 has 5 desired goods.
By the proof of Theorem 3.14, w(r, 1) = B(r − 1) − B(r − 1, 1) = 1/2r. When RWAV
starts, all group members have r = 5 and s = 1 so their weight is w(5, 1) = 1/32. In
the first turn, group 1 picks a good that is desired by some members; all these members
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now have s = 0 so their weight changes to 0 and they do not affect the voting from here
on. In the next turn, group 2 picks a good. If this good is desired by some members
of group 1, then all these members have r → r − 1 = 4, so their voting weight in the
next turn becomes 1/24 = 1/16—twice the voting weight of a member with 5 desired
goods. The process continues in this fashion, with the weight of a member who “loses”
a desired good (since it is taken by the other group) multiplied by 2. Thus the interests
of poorer agents are prioritized, in the spirit of the egalitarian philosophy.
Asymptotically the lower bound of Theorem 3.14 almost matches the upper bound,
but for small values of c there is a gap. In particular, for c = 2 the upper bound is
h ≤ 2/3 (Proposition 3.1) and the lower bound is h ≥ 1/2. We conjecture that the
correct value of h is 2/3:
Conjecture 3.16. 2/3-democratic 1-of-best-2 fairness is always attainable.
An equivalent formulation of the conjecture is that if every agent desires exactly two
goods, then there exists an allocation such that at least two-thirds of the agents in each
group receive at least one desirable good.
We support the conjecture with two theorems. The first improves the lower bound
from 1/2 to 3/5 using an enhancement to the RWAV protocol. The second improves the
lower bound to 2/3 for the special case of identical groups.
Theorem 3.17. For every c ≥ 2, there is a protocol that guarantees 1-of-best-c fairness
to at least 2
c−1
2c+1 of the members in each group. In particular, it guarantees 3/5-democratic
1-of-best-2 fairness.
Proof. For 1-of-best-c fairness, we can ignore all agents who want less than c goods (since
they may be given a value of 0), and assume that all agents want at least c goods. Then
the following protocol can be used.
Enhanced RWAV protocol:
• If, in one of the groups, at least 2c−12c+1 of the agents desire the same good g,
then give g to that group and give all other goods to the other group.
• Otherwise, run RWAV as usual.
As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, we have to prove that, for each group i, its balance
when it first picks a good is at least 2
c−1
2c+1 · ni.
We have r ≥ c and s = 1 for all agents, so the initial payment of each agent is at least
B(c, 1) = 1− 1/2c. Therefore the initial balance of group 1 is 2c−12c · n1 > 2
c−1
2c+1 · n1.
As for group 2, before its first turn it might have to pay to members who “lose” a
desired good to group 1. There are less than 2
c−1
2c+1 · n2 such members, and the weight
of each is at most w(c, 1) = 1/2c. Therefore the initial balance of group 2 is above
(1− 1/2c)n2 − (1/2c) · 2c−12c+1 · n2 = 2
c−1
2c+1 · n2.
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Example 3.18. Consider an instance with five goods {v,w, x, y, z} and two groups with
10 members in each family (for brevity, a member is represented by a concatenation of
the goods he desires):
• Group 1: vw, vx, vy, vz, wx,wy,wz, xy, xz, yz;
• Group 2: vw, vw, vw, vx, vx, vx, vy, vy, vz, vz.
Consider first RWAV without the enhancement. In group 1’s first turn, all goods have
the same total weight. For concreteness, we assume that ties are broken in the order
v > w > x > y > z, so group 1 picks v. In group 2’s turn, w and x are tied, so it
picks w. In group 1’s next turn, all goods are again tied, so it picks x. Then group 2
picks y and group 1 picks z. In the final allocation, only 5 out of 10 members in group
2 (vw, vw, vw, vy, vy) are happy; this exactly matches the lower bound guaranteed by
Theorem 3.14.
In contrast, the enhanced RWAV gives v to group 2 and all other goods to group 1.
Then all members in both groups are happy.
Two groups are said to be identical if there exists a bijection mapping each agent in
one group to an agent in the other group with an identical utility function. We show that
if the two groups are identical, the bound 2/3 can be achieved.9 This exactly matches
the upper bound in Proposition 3.1, which also applies to identical groups.
Theorem 3.19. For two identical groups, there is an efficient protocol that guarantees
1-of-best-2 fairness to at least 2/3 of the members in each group.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that each agent desires exactly 2 goods. We use
the following notation. Given an allocation (G1, G2), for each good g ∈ G and integer
y ∈ {0, 1, 2}, define py(g) (resp. qy(g)) as the number of agents in group 1 (resp. 2) who
want g and receive utility y from the allocation. Since the groups are identical, we have
that for every g ∈ G, p0(g) = q2(g), p1(g) = q1(g), and p2(g) = q0(g).
The protocol proceeds as follows. Start with an arbitrary allocation (G1, G2). If there
is a good g ∈ G1 for which q0(g) > p1(g), move g to G2. Similarly, if there is a good
g ∈ G2 for which p0(g) > q1(g), move g to G1. Stop when no good satisfies either of the
conditions.
The number of utility-1 agents (across both groups) strictly increases in each iteration:
when a good is taken from G1, the number of utility-1 agents in it increases by p2(g) −
p1(g), and when it is given to G2, the number of utility-1 agents in it increases by
q0(g) − q1(g), so the net increase is p2(g) + q0(g)− p1(g) − q1(g) = 2q0(g)− 2p1(g) ≥ 2.
Similarly, when a good is moved from G2 to G1 the number of utility-1 agents increases
by 2p0(g)− 2q1(g) ≥ 2. Hence the algorithm stops after at most (n1 + n2)/2 iterations.
When the algorithm stops, for all g ∈ G1 we have q0(g) ≤ q1(g). Since each agent
with utility 1 is counted once in q1(g) and each agent with utility 0 is counted twice in
q0(g), this implies that the number of utility-1 agents in group 2 is at least twice the
number of utility-0 agents in group 2, so at most 1/3 the agents in group 2 have utility
0. By similar considerations, at most 1/3 the agents in group 1 have utility 0.
9We are grateful to Katie Edwards for the proof idea: https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2412319/29780.
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Example 3.20. Consider an instance with five goods {v,w, x, y, z} and two identical
groups with 10 members: vw, vw, vw, vx, vx, vx, vy, vy, vz, vz (like group 2 in Example
3.18). Suppose the algorithm of Theorem 3.19 starts by giving all goods to group 2, i.e.,
G1 = ∅, G2 = {v,w, x, y, z}. The algorithm can proceed in many ways depending on
the order in which the goods are considered. For example, suppose y is considered first.
We have p0(y) = 2 while q1(y) = 0, so y is moved to group 1. Suppose v is considered
next. Now p0(v) = 8 while q1(v) = 2, so v is moved to group 1. The allocation becomes
G1 = {v, y}, G2 = {w, x, z}. Now q0(y) = 2 while p1(y) = 0, so y is moved again to
group 2. The final allocation is G1 = {v}, G2 = {w, x, y, z}.10
3.4. 1-out-of-c MMS fairness
We now proceed to a stronger fairness requirement.
Theorem 3.21. For every c ≥ 3, RWAV can guarantee 1-out-of-c MMS-fairness to at
least 1− 1/2c−1 of the members in both groups.
Proof. 1-out-of-c MMS-fairness means that, for every d ∈ {0, . . . , c−1} and every s ≥ 1,
an agent with r = cs + d desirable goods should receive at least s such goods. Without
loss of generality, we assume that all agents have only cs desirable goods (if an agent has
cs + d desirable goods, we simply ignore d of them). By Lemma 3.6, we can guarantee
this fairness condition to at least infs≥1B(cs−1, s) of the agents in both groups. Hence,
to prove the theorem it is sufficient to prove that, for every c ≥ 3 and s ≥ 1:
B(cs− 1, s) ≥ 1− 1/2c−1.
The proof requires various technical lemmas on binomial coefficients. These can be found
in Appendix A. The claim itself is proved as Lemma A.11.11
While our main focus is on democratic fairness for any number of agents, we note that
our results imply unanimous fairness when the number of agents is bounded.
Corollary 3.22. For two groups each containing at most n agents with binary valua-
tions, there exists a unanimous 1-out-of-(⌈log2(n+ 1)⌉+ 1) MMS-fair allocation.
Proof. Let c = ⌈log2(n + 1)⌉ + 1, so n ≤ 2c−1 − 1. By Theorem 3.21, we can attain
(1 − 1/2c−1)-democratic 1-out-of-c MMS-fairness. However, (1 − 1/2c−1)-democratic
fairness and unanimous fairness are equivalent when the number of agents in each group
is at most 2c−1 − 1.
Proposition 3.3 implies that the O(log n) rate cannot be improved.
10 An implementation of this algorithm can be found at https://github.com/erelsgl/family-fair-
allocation. It can be used to produce more examples.
11 This theorem appeared in the conference version of this paper [Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018].
Due to the error explained in Footnote 8, the proof there was much shorter. Happily, the theorem
still holds after correcting the error, albeit with a much longer proof.
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3.5. MMS and EF1
Since Theorem 3.21 is not valid for c = 2, it does not say anything about MMS fairness (or
about EF1, which is equivalent to MMS for binary agents). In fact, currently RWAV gives
no meaningful lower bounds for MMS fairness. This is because the sequence B(2s−1, s)
is decreasing and approaches 0 (see Table 3). However, we can prove an existential lower
bound that matches the upper bound of Proposition 3.4.12,13
Theorem 3.23. When a round-robin protocol is used for dividing goods between two
groups:
(a) The first group can always pick goods in such a way that the resulting allocation
is envy-free for at least 1/2 of its members;
(b) The second group can always pick goods in such a way that the resulting allocation
is EF1 (and MMS-fair) to at least 1/2 of its members.
Proof. We prove each part in turn.
(a) Each agent j ∈ A1 with 2sj − 1 or 2sj desired goods needs to get at least sj of these
goods in order to be envy-free. Without loss of generality, we assume that j has
only 2sj − 1 desirable goods (otherwise we ignore one such good arbitrarily).
We claim that group 1 has a strategy that guarantees to at least half its members j, at
least sj desired goods. Suppose by contradiction that the claim is false. This means
that, for every picking strategy of group 1, group 2 can (adversarially) pick goods so
that more than half of group 1’s members get less than sj goods. Equivalently, for
more than half of group 1’s members, at least sj of their desired goods are picked
by group 2.
However, if group 2 had such a strategy, group 1 could just copy this strategy and
play it against group 2 (from the second step onwards). This would guarantee that
more than half of the members of group 1 receive at least sj of their desired goods.
(b) We consider the game after group 1 picks its first good, as a new game in which
group 2 plays first. By part (a), group 2 has a strategy that guarantees that the
allocation from this point on will be 1/2-democratic EF. Accounting for the first
good picked by group 1, the entire allocation is 1/2-democratic EF1.
3.6. Maximizing the fraction of happy agents
While the main focus of this paper is on finding worst-case bounds on h, we briefly
discuss the related problem of maximizing h in a specific instance. In particular, in
the spirit of egalitarianism, we would like to maximize the number of agents who get a
12 In fact, in Section 4 we present a protocol for two groups that guarantees 1/2-democratic EF1 even
for monotonic agents (Theorem 4.2). However, Theorem 3.23 is interesting since it shows that this
guarantee can also be attained by a round-robin protocol.
13We are grateful to J. Kreft for the proof idea: https://mathoverflow.net/a/307677/34461.
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positive fraction of their MMS. Unfortunately this problem does not admit a polynomial-
time algorithm unless P = NP: we prove this by showing that even deciding whether an
instance admits an allocation that gives all agents a positive utility is NP-hard.
Proposition 3.24. (a) Deciding whether a binary instance with two groups admits an
allocation that gives every agent a positive utility is NP-complete.
(b) Deciding whether a binary instance with two groups admits an allocation that gives
every agent a positive fraction of the MMS is NP-complete.
Proof. For any allocation, we can clearly verify in polynomial time whether it yields a
positive utility to every agent, and whether it is positive-MMS fair for every agent. We
now show NP-hardness.
(a) We reduce from Monotone SAT, a variant of the classical satisfiability problem
where each clause contains either only positive literals or only negative literals. Mono-
tone SAT is known to be NP-hard [Garey and Johnson, 1979, p. 259].
Given a Monotone SAT formula φ with variables x1, . . . , xm, let there be m goods
corresponding to the m variables. For each clause that contains only positive literals,
we construct an agent in the first group who values exactly the goods contained in this
clause. Similarly, for each clause that contains only negative literals, we construct an
agent in the second group who values exactly the goods contained in this clause. Any
assignment that satisfies φ gives rise to an allocation where the goods corresponding to
true variables in the assignment are allocated to the first group and those corresponding
to false variables in the assignment are allocated to the second group; this allocation
gives every agent a positive utility (at least 1). Likewise, any allocation that gives every
agent a positive utility yields a satisfying assignment of φ. Hence the reduction is valid.
(b) We reduce from the problem of part (a), Positive Utility. Given an instance,
consider first all agents who desire a single good. If two of them are in different groups
but desire the same good, then it is clearly impossible to give all agents a positive utility,
so return False. Otherwise, give all these agents their desired goods and remove them
and their goods from the instance. Repeat this process until there remains an instance
in which every agent has at least two desirable goods, so the MMS of every agent is at
least 1. An allocation is now positive-MMS for an agent if and only if it gives the agent a
positive utility; use the solver for the positive-MMS problem and return its answer.
The above reduction can be used in the opposite direction: if we have a SAT solver
that can quickly solve Monotone SAT problems, then we can use it to quickly decide
whether a fair division instance admits a unanimous positive-MMS allocation.
However, this reduction does not work for the related maximization problem. Consider
the problem MAX-SAT: given a formula φ, find an assignment satisfying a maximum
number of clauses in φ. A solver for MAX-SAT can be used to find an allocation which
gives a positive utility to a maximum number of agents, but ignores their groups. For
example, it prefers an allocation in which 9 out of 10 members of the first group and 1
out of 10 members of the second group are happy, to an allocation in which 4 members
of each groups are happy. In contrast, we are interested of maximizing the minimum
number (or fraction) of happy agents in each group. For this we need to solve a problem
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that can be termed “MAX-MIN-SAT”: given two formulas φ1, φ2, find an assignment
which maximizes the minimum between the number of clauses satisfied in φ1 and number
of clauses satisfied in φ2. A more general problem, in which there are k formulas,
has been studied recently by Bhangale et al. [2015]. When k is sufficiently small (in
particular, when k = 2 as in our case), they provide a polynomial-time constant-factor
approximation.
4. Two Groups with Additive or General Valuations
In this section, we assume that there are two groups and each agent can have either an
additive or a general monotonic utility function.
4.1. Negative results
The negative results for binary agents (Section 3.1) obviously also hold for additive
agents. In fact, for additive valuations we have a stronger impossibility: we cannot
guarantee more than 1/2 of the MMS to more than 1/3 of the members in each group.
Proposition 4.1. For any h > 1/3 and q > 1/2, there is an additive instance with two
groups in which no allocation is h-democratic q-fraction-MMS-fair.
Proof. Consider an instance with m = 3 goods and n1 = n2 = 3 agents in each group,
with utility vectors: ui1 = (2, 1, 1), ui2 = (1, 2, 1), and ui3 = (1, 1, 2) for i = 1, 2. The
MMS of every agent is 2. In any allocation, one group receives at most one good, so at
most one of its three agents receives utility more than 1. In that group, at most 1/3 of
the agents receive more than 1/2 of their MMS.
In the following subsection we will match this upper bound by showing that it is
always possible to guarantee 1/2 of the MMS to 1/2 of the members in each group.
4.2. Positive results
The positive results for 1-of-best-c fairness (Section 3.3) are valid for additive valuations
too: given an additive instance, we simply convert, for each agent, the utilities of her c
best goods to 1 and the utilities of the other goods to 0, and obtain a binary instance
to which our previous positive results apply.
However, for the more general monotonic valuations, and for stronger fairness criteria
such as EF1 and MMS, we need a different technique.
Theorem 4.2. For two groups of agents with monotonic valuations, 1/2-democratic
EF1 is attainable with an efficient protocol.
Proof. We arrange the goods on a line and process them from left to right. Starting
from an empty block, we add one good at a time until the current block is EF1 for at
least half of the agents in at least one group. We allocate the current block to one such
group, and the remaining goods to the other group.
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Since the whole set of goods is EF1 for both groups, the protocol terminates. Assume
without loss of generality that the left block G1 is allocated to the first group A1, and
the right block G2 to the second group A2. By the description of the protocol, the
allocation is EF1 for at least half of the agents in A1, so it remains to show that the
same holds for A2. Let g be the last good added to the left block. More than half of
the agents in A2 think that G1\{g} is not EF1, so for these agents, G1\{g} is worth less
than G2 ∪{g}\{g′} for any g′ ∈ G2 ∪{g}. Taking g′ = g, we find that these agents value
G1\{g} less than G2. But this implies that the agents find G2 to be EF1, completing
the proof.
An example run of this algorithm is shown in Appendix B.2.
Remark 4.3. Proposition 3.4 shows that the factor 1/2 in Theorem 4.2 cannot be
improved even for binary agents and even if we relax EF1 to EFc for any constant c.
Remark 4.4. Theorem 4.2 shows that if the goods lie on a line, we can find a 1/2-
democratic EF1 allocation that moreover gives each group a contiguous block on the line.
This may be important, for example, if the goods are houses on a street and each group
wants to have all its houses in a contiguous block [Barrera et al., 2015, Bouveret et al.,
2017, Suksompong, 2019].
Remark 4.5. The proof of Theorem 4.2 can be modified to show the existence of an
allocation such that for at least half of the agents in each group, their envy towards
the other group can be eliminated by removing the same good from the other group’s
bundle. This is similar to the notion of strong envy-freeness up to one good (s-EF1)
proposed for individual fair division by Conitzer et al. [2019], where the good that needs
to be removed from an agent’s bundle is independent of the envying agent.
For additive agents, Theorem 4.2 can be combined with Lemmas 2.3 and 2.7:
Corollary 4.6. For two groups with additive agents, the following are attainable with
an efficient protocol:
(a) 1/2-democratic PROP∗1;
(b) 1/2-democratic 1/2-fraction-MMS-fairness;
(c) 1/2-democratic 1-out-of-3 MMS-fairness;
(d) 1/2-democratic MMS-fairness, if the valuations are binary.
The 1/2-democratic factor in part (b) is “almost” tight by Proposition 4.1. For part
(d), it is tight by Proposition 3.4. For part (c) we do not know if it is tight: currently
our best upper bound for h-democratic 1-out-of-3 fairness is h ≤ 7/8 for binary agents,
by Proposition 3.3.
Note that part (d) was proved existentially in Theorem 3.23, but Corollary 4.6 also
gives an efficient protocol.
While our main focus is on democratic fairness for any number of agents, we can attain
a weaker unanimous fairness guarantee by reducing to cake cutting.
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Theorem 4.7. For any two groups of agents with additive valuations, there exists an
allocation that is EF(n − 1) for all agents, where n = n1 + n2 is the total number of
agents in both groups.
Proof. Choose an arbitrary agent in one of the groups. We will partition the goods into
two parts and let the agent choose the part that she prefers. The resulting allocation is
envy-free for this agent and hence also EF(n − 1) for her. It therefore suffices to show
that there exists a partition in which each bundle is EF(n−1) (with respect to the other
bundle) for all of the remaining n− 1 agents.
To this end, assume that there is a divisible good (“cake”) represented by the half-open
interval (0,m]. The value-density functions of the agents over the cake are piecewise-
constant: for every l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the value-density vij in the half-open interval (l−1, l]
equals uij(gl).
It is known that there exists a partition of the cake into two parts, using at most n−1
cuts, in which every agent has equal value for both parts [Alon, 1987]. Starting with
two empty bundles, for each l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we add good gl to the bundle corresponding
to the part that contains at least half of the interval (l − 1, l]. (If both parts contain
exactly half of the interval, we add gl to an arbitrary bundle.)
We claim that every agent finds either bundle to be EF(n− 1). Fix an agent aij and
a bundle G′. From our partitioning choice, we have that uij(G\G′)− uij(G′) ≤ uij(G′′)
for some set G′′ ⊆ G\G′ of size at most n − 1. This implies that the agent finds G′ to
be EF(n− 1) with respect to G \G′, as claimed.
Note that the result of Alon [1987] is existential: as far as we know, there is no efficient
way to compute the cake partition. Therefore the proof of Theorem 4.7 does not give
rise to an efficient implementation.
5. Three or More Groups
In this section, we study the most general setting where we allocate goods among any
number of groups. Similarly to the previous sections, we start with negative results and
move on to positive results. Recall that k denotes the number of groups.
5.1. Negative results
The following proposition generalizes Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 5.1. For any k ≥ 2 and any h > k/(2k − 1), there is a binary instance in
which no allocation is h-democratic positive-MMS-fair.
Proof. There are 2k−1 goods placed in a circle. In each group there are 2k−1 members.
Each member of a group values a unique block of k consecutive goods on the circle; the
member has utility 1 for each of the k goods and utility 0 for the remaining k− 1 goods.
Each agent has a positive MMS (1). However, in any allocation some group gets at most
one good, and only k members of the group get positive utility.
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In particular, when the number of groups is large, it is not possible to satisfy more
than about half of the agents.
Next, we generalize Proposition 3.2 to an arbitrary number of groups.
Proposition 5.2. Let r, s be integers such that r ≥ s ≥ 1. There exists a binary instance
with k groups in which each agent desires exactly r goods and needs s goods in order to
consider the allocation fair, where it is impossible to attain more than MaxH(r, s)-
democratic fairness, where:
MaxH(r, s) =
{
0 when r ≤ ks− 1;
1
kr
∑r
i=s(k − 1)r−i
(
r
i
)
when r ≥ ks.
Proof. For the case r ≤ ks − 1, consider an instance with r goods, where all agents in
all groups desire all goods. At least one group will get at most r/k < s goods, so all of
its members will be unhappy.
For the case r ≥ ks, consider an instance with km goods, for some m ≫ r. In each
group there are
(km
r
)
members, each of whom wants a distinct subset of r goods. At
least one group will get at most m goods. In this group, the fraction of happy agents
will be at most: ∑r
i=s
(m
i
) · (km−mr−i )(km
r
) .
When m≫ r, the numerator is approximately ∑ri=s mii! · (k−1)r−imr−i(r−i)! =∑ri=s (k−1)r−imri!(r−i)!
and the denominator is approximately (km)
r
r! =
krmr
r! . Therefore when m → ∞ the
expression approaches 1kr
∑r
i=s(k − 1)r−i
(r
i
)
.
In particular, we get the following generalization of Proposition 3.3:
Proposition 5.3. For any integers k, c ≥ 2 and any h > 1− (k−1k )c, there is a binary
instance with k groups in which no allocation is h-democratic 1-of-best-c fair (hence no
allocation is 1-out-of-c MMS-fair).
Proof. Apply Proposition 5.2 with r = c and s = 1. Then MaxH(r, s) ≤ 1kc
∑c
i=1(k −
1)c−i
(
c
i
)
= k
c−(k−1)c
kc = 1−
(
k−1
k
)c
.
As a generalization of Proposition 3.4, we get:
Proposition 5.4. For any constant integer c ≥ 1 and any h > 1/k, there is a binary
instance with k groups in which no allocation is h-democratic EFc.
Proof. Assume that there are m = km′ goods for some large positive integer m′. Each
group consists of 2m agents, each of whom values a distinct combination of the goods.
Consider first an allocation that gives exactly m′ goods to each group, and fix a group.
We claim that the fraction of the agents in the group whose utilities for some two bundles
differ by at most c converges to 0 for large m′. Indeed, this follows from the central limit
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theorem: Fix two bundles and consider a random agent from the group; let X be the
random variable denoting the (possibly negative) difference between the agent’s utilities
for the two bundles. Then X is a sum of m′ independent and identically distributed
random variables with mean 0. The central limit theorem implies that for any fixed
ǫ > 0, there exists a constant d such that Pr[|X| ≤ c] ≤ Pr[|X| ≤ d√m′] ≤ ǫ for any
sufficiently large m′.
Taking the union bound over all pairs of bundles, we find that the fraction of agents in
the group who value some two bundles within c of each other approaches 0 as m′ goes to
infinity. This means that all but a negligible fraction of the agents find only one bundle
to be EFc. By symmetry, 1/k of these agents find the bundle allocated to the group to
be EFc. It follows that the fraction of agents in the group for whom the allocation is
EFc converges to 1/k.
It remains to consider the case where the allocation does not give the same number
of goods to all groups. In this case, let G denote the set of bundles with the smallest
number of goods, which must be strictly smaller than m′ goods. If we move goods from
bundles with more than m′ goods to bundles in G in such a way that the number of
goods in each bundle in G increases by exactly one, the fraction of agents in an arbitrary
group that receives a bundle in G who finds the allocation to be EFc can only increase.
We can repeat this process, at each step possibly adding bundles to G, until all bundles
contain the same number of goods, which is the case we have already handled. Since the
fraction of agents for whom the allocation is EFc is bounded above by 1/k for large m′ in
the latter allocation, and this fraction only increases during our process of moving goods,
the same is true in the original allocation for the groups with less than m′ goods.
5.2. Approximate envy-freeness
When there are two groups, the protocol in Theorem 4.2 is computationally efficient
and yields an allocation that is both approximately envy-free and approximately pro-
portional. In this subsection and the next, we present two ways of generalizing the result
to multiple groups: one keeps the approximate envy-freeness guarantee but loses compu-
tational efficiency, while the other keeps only the approximate proportionality guarantee
but also retains computational efficiency.
Our first theorem establishes the existence of a 1/k-democratic EF2 allocation for k
groups with arbitrary monotonic valuations. Note that by Proposition 5.4, the factor
1/k cannot be improved.
Theorem 5.5. For k groups with agents having arbitrary monotonic valuations, there
exists an allocation that is 1/k-democratic EF2.
Proof. Bilo` et al. [2019] proved that for any k agents with monotonic valuations, if the
goods lie on a line, there exists an EF2 allocation that gives each agent a contiguous
block on the line. We present their proof briefly (keeping only the details required for
our purposes), and then show how to adapt their proof to the group setting.
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Bilo` et al.’s protocol considers a k-vertex simplex in Rk that is triangulated to smaller
k-vertex sub-simplices. It identifies each vertex of the triangulation with a sub-partition,
i.e., a partition of some subset of G into k parts (some goods might not appear in any
part). This identification has the following properties:
1. In each main vertex i ∈ {1, . . . , k} of the main simplex, part i contains all of G
while the other k − 1 parts are empty.
2. In each face spanned by main vertices i1, . . . , il of the main simplex, only parts
i1, . . . , il contain goods, while the other k − l parts are empty.
3. In each small sub-simplex of the triangulation, consider the k sub-partitions at-
tached to its k vertices. For each good g ∈ G, there is a unique i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such
that
(a) g belongs to part i in at least one of these k sub-partitions;
(b) g does not belong to another part in any of these k sub-partitions.
4. For each part i ∈ {1, . . . , k} in any such sub-partition, there are at most two goods
that do not belong to this part i but belong to part i in some other sub-partition.
For instance, if there are k = 4 agents and m = 12 goods, a possible set of four sub-
partitions that satisfy properties 3 and 4 is the following:
• ({g1, g2, g3}, {g4, g5, g6}, {g7, g8, g9}, {g11, g12})
• ({g1, g2, g3}, {g5, g6}, {g7, g8, g9}, {g11, g12})
• ({g1, g2, g3}, {g5, g6}, {g8, g9}, {g11, g12})
• ({g1, g2, g3}, {g5, g6}, {g8, g9, g10}, {g11, g12})
For each vertex of the triangulation, the protocol asks each agent which of the k parts
in the attached sub-partition he prefers the most, and labels the vertex with the answers.
Since the agents’ valuations are monotonic, we can assume that an agent never prefers
an empty bundle to a non-empty bundle. Hence, by property 1, each main vertex i
only has label i. By property 2, all face vertices are labeled only with labels from the
endpoints i1, . . . , il of the face. Thus, each agent’s labeling satisfies Sperner’s boundary
condition. Therefore, by Bapat [1989]’s generalization of Sperner’s lemma, there exists a
sub-simplex and a matching of its vertices to the agents such that, in the vertex matched
to agent i, agent i prefers part i. By property 3, if we unite all parts numbered i in all
the k sub-partitions of the sub-simplex, we get a partition of G. In the example above,
the united partition is:
• ({g1, g2, g3}, {g4, g5, g6}, {g7, g8, g9, g10}, {g11, g12}).
By property 4, in this united partition, each part j is larger than the corresponding
parts j in the sub-partitions by at most two goods. Therefore, each agent i finds part i
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better than any other part j, up to at most two goods. As a result, giving part i of the
united partition to agent i yields an EF2 allocation.
To adapt Bilo` et al.’s proof to the group setting, we define a representative for each
group, and run their protocol on the k representatives. Whenever a representative is
asked to select a best part, he uses plurality voting among the group members, and
answers by specifying the index of the part preferred by the largest number of members
(breaking ties arbitrarily). Since each agent prefers a non-empty bundle to an empty
bundle, the representative also prefers a non-empty bundle to an empty bundle. Hence
the representative’s answers satisfy Sperner’s boundary conditions. This means that
there exists a sub-simplex in which, in each vertex i, the representative of group i
prefers part i. By the pigeonhole principle, in the sub-partition attached to this vertex
i, at least 1/k of the members in group i prefer part i. In the united partition, these
members find part i better than any other part up to at most 2 goods. Therefore, giving
part i to group i yields a 1/k-democratic EF2 allocation.
Example 5.6. Consider an instance with k = 4 groups with 5 agents in each group.
Consider the subsimplex whose four corners correspond to the four sub-partitions shown
above. Suppose the outcomes of the plurality votes are as follows:
• In allocation ({g1, g2, g3}, {g4, g5, g6}, {g7, g8, g9}, {g11, g12}), in group 1: {g1, g2, g3}
wins two votes while each of the other bundles wins one vote.
• In allocation ({g1, g2, g3}, {g5, g6}, {g7, g8, g9}, {g11, g12}), in group 2: {g5, g6} wins
two votes while each of the other bundles wins one vote.
• In allocation ({g1, g2, g3}, {g5, g6}, {g8, g9}, {g11, g12}), in group 3: {g8, g9} wins
two votes while each of the other bundles wins one vote.
• In allocation ({g1, g2, g3}, {g5, g6}, {g8, g9, g10}, {g11, g12}), in group 4: {g11, g12}
wins two votes while each of the other bundles wins one vote.
Then, in the final allocation, group 1 gets {g1, g2, g3}, group 2 gets {g4, g5, g6}, group
3 gets {g7, g8, g9, g10} and group 4 gets {g11, g12}. In each group, at least two members
believe that their group’s bundle is better than all other bundles in one of the sub-
partitions. These same agents believe that their group’s bundle is better-up-to-2-goods
than all other bundles in the final allocation. Hence, the allocation is 2/5-democratic
EF2 (and therefore also 1/4-democratic EF2).
In the special case that all agents have binary valuations, the fairness guarantee can be
improved to EF1 by adapting the proof for the individual setting [Barrera et al., 2015,
Suksompong, 2019] to the group setting. The adaptation uses plurality voting similarly
to Theorem 5.5. We only state the result here and defer the proof to Appendix D.
Theorem 5.7. For k groups in which all agents have binary valuations, there exists an
allocation that is 1/k-democratic EF1, PROP∗(k − 1) and MMS-fair.
By Proposition 5.4, the factor 1/k is again tight.
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Remark 5.8. Bilo` et al. [2019] proved that, for k ≤ 4 agents, the fairness guarantee can
be improved from EF2 to EF1 even when the agents have arbitrary monotonic valuations.
It is possible that this result can be adapted to the group setting using plurality voting
in a similar manner as in the previous two theorems. This would mean that for k ≤ 4
groups of agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, there exists a 1/k-democratic EF1
allocation. However, their proof is rather involved and we have not been able to verify
that our reduction works for it. Likewise, for k ≥ 5 groups we do not know whether
1/k-democratic EF1 is attainable.
Barrera et al. [2015], Suksompong [2019] and Bilo` et al. [2019] did not provide efficient
algorithms for computing the corresponding approximate envy-free allocations. It is an
interesting question whether such allocations can be found in polynomial time, both for
the individual setting and the group setting.
5.3. Approximate proportionality
In this subsection, we show that if the fairness requirement is weakened from approximate
envy-freeness to approximate proportionality, a 1/k-democratic fair allocation can be
attained in time polynomial in the input size.
Theorem 5.9. When agents have additive valuations, it is possible to efficiently compute
a 1/k-democratic PROP∗(k − 1) allocation.14
Proof. Similarly to the previous subsection, we use an existing algorithm for fair division
among individuals [Suksompong, 2019] and adapt it to groups. We first describe the
individual division algorithm.
We arrange the goods in a line and process them from left to right. Starting from an
empty block, we add one good at a time. After each addition we ask each agent whether
the current block is PROP∗(k − 1). If one or more agents answer “yes”, an arbitrary one
among them receives the current block, and the process continues with the remaining
k − 1 agents. Finally, the remaining goods are given to the last agent. To prove that
the allocation is fair, it is sufficient to prove that the remaining goods indeed satisfy
PROP∗(k − 1) for the last agent.
Number the agents 1, 2, . . . , k according to the order in which they receive their bundle.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, denote the bundle already allocated to agent i by Xi ∪ {yi},
where yi is the rightmost good (the last good added to the bundle) and Xi is the set of
the other goods in the bundle. By our assumptions, the bundles X1, . . . ,Xk−1 do not
satisfy PROP∗(k − 1) for agent k.
The remaining bundle is Xk = G \
(
∪k−1i=1Xi
⋃∪k−1i=1 {yi}). We claim that Xk satisfies
PROP∗(k − 1) for agent k. Specifically, we denote C := {y1, . . . , yk−1}, note that C ⊆
G \Xk, and claim that uk(Xk) ≥ 1kuk(G \ C).
14 Note that PROP∗(k − 1) is slightly stronger than the proportionality relaxations considered by
Conitzer et al. [2017], Aziz et al. [2019], and Suksompong [2019]. By our Lemma 2.7, it also implies
1/k-fraction-MMS-fairness, 1-out-of-(2k − 1) MMS-fairness, and (if all agents have binary utilities)
also MMS-fairness.
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Indeed, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}: C ⊆ G \ Xi, and the bundle Xi does not satisfy
PROP∗(k − 1), so uk(Xi) < 1kuk(G \ C). But ∪ki=1Xi = G \ C, so
∑k
i=1 uk(Xi) =
uk(G \ C). Hence uk(Xk) > 1kuk(G \ C).
We use the same algorithm for dividing the goods among groups. Whenever a group
is asked whether the current block satisfies PROP∗(k − 1), it poses this question to its
members, and answers “yes” if at least 1/k of the agents answer yes. To prove that the
allocation is fair, it is sufficient to prove that the remaining goods satisfy PROP∗(k − 1)
for at least 1/k of the agents in the kth group. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, denote the
bundle already allocated to group i by Xi ∪{yi}, where yi is the rightmost good and Xi
consists of the other goods. By our assumptions, the bundles Xi satisfy PROP
∗(k − 1)
for less than 1/k of the members in group k. Hence, for more than 1/k of the members in
group k, none of the bundles X1, . . . ,Xk−1 satisfies PROP
∗(k − 1). For these members,
Xk must satisfy the fairness criterion due to the same argument as above. Hence, the
allocation is 1/k-democratic PROP∗(k − 1).
An example run of this algorithm is shown in Appendix B.3.
5.4. 1-of-best-c fairness
The results in the previous subsections guarantee 1/k-democratic fairness, which means
that the fraction of happy agents approaches 0 when the number of groups grows to
infinity. In this subsection we show that the RWAV protocol of Section 3.2 can be adapted
to attain h-democratic 1-of-best-c fairness where h approaches a positive constant (1/3)
even when k →∞.
5.4.1. RWAV protocol for k groups
The round-robin protocol for k groups proceeds exactly the same as for two groups: each
group in its turn picks a good until all goods are taken. As in Section 3.2, each group
picks a good using weighted approval voting among its members. The only difference
is in the weight-function w(r, s). For each k ≥ 2, we use the following weight function
(where Lk := 2
1/(k−1)):
wk(r, 0) = 0 ∀r ∈ Z;
wk(r, 1) =
{
(Lk − 1)/Lrk r ≥ 1;
0 r ≤ 0.
Currently, we know how to define the weights only for s ≤ 1; hence we can handle
only 1-of-best-c fairness, for which s ≤ 1. Note that for k = 2 we get Lk = 2 and
wk(r, 1) = 1/2
r, which matches the calculation in Example 3.15.
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5.4.2. Analysis of RWAV
Below we extend the analysis of Section 3.2 to k groups. First, we extend the budget
function B(r, s) to:
Bk(r, 0) = 1 ∀r ∈ Z;
Bk(r, 1) =
{
1− 1/Lrk r ≥ 0;
0 r ≤ 0.
Note that, analogously to the case k = 2, we have:
wk(r, s) = Bk(r, s)−Bk(r − 1, s) ∀s ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ Z.
We add to the protocol the following payment steps:
• Initialization: each member j of group i pays Bk(rj , sj) to group i.
• Whenever group i picks a good g, every member j of group i who wants g pays
1−Bk(rj, sj) to group i.
• Whenever a group i′ 6= i picks a good g, every member j of group i who wants g
receives wk(rj , sj) from group i.
The analogue of Lemma 3.9 is:
Lemma 5.10. During the protocol, the balance of each agent j is always −Bk(rj , sj).
Proof. We prove the claim for members of group 1; the proof for other groups is analo-
gous. We proceed by induction. The induction base is handled by the initialization.
After a group i′ 6= 1 picks a good g, the balance of each member who wants g increases.
The new balance of each such member with r remaining goods is:
−Bk(r, s) + wk(r, s) = −Bk(r − 1, s)
and indeed, for each such member, r drops by 1 while s does not change.
After group 1 picks a good g, the balance of each member who values g at 1 becomes
−1 = −Bk(rj , 0), and indeed, for each such member, s becomes 0.
Below we will need the following inequality on wk:
k∑
i=2
wk(r − i+ 2, 1) = wk(r, 1) + · · ·+ wk(r − k + 2, 1) (3)
≤ Lk − 1
Lrk
(1 + · · ·+ Lk−2k ) (definition of wk)
=
Lk − 1
Lrk
· L
k−1
k − 1
Lk − 1 (sum of geometeric series)
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=
2− 1
Lrk
=
1
Lrk
(definition of Lk)
= 1−Bk(r, 1) (definition of Bk)
(In fact, wk was calculated precisely to satisfy this inequality; it holds with equality
when r ≥ k − 1.)
The analogue of Lemma 3.10 is:
Lemma 5.11. For each group i, after k consecutive turns starting at the turn of group
i, the balance of group i weakly increases.
Proof. We prove the claim for group 1; the proof for other groups is analogous. We
calculate the change in the balance of group 1 in a sequence of k turns in which group
1 picks a good g1 and then the other groups pick goods g2, . . . , gk. The members with
sj = 0 have a weight of 0, so they neither pay nor receive anything; therefore we assume
without loss of generality that all members have sj = 1.
Denote by D1 the subset of group 1 members who desire g1. Each member j in D1
pays to the group 1−Bk(rj , 1), which by (3) above is at least:
k∑
i=2
wk(r − i+ 2, 1).
For i ≥ 2, denote by Di the set of group 1 members who desire gi. Each member j in
D2 \D1 receives wk(rj , 1) from the group account. Each member j in D3 \D1 who had
rj remaining goods at the start of the turn might now have only rj − 1 desired goods,
so he may receive up to max[wk(rj − 1, 1), wk(rj , 1)]; since wk is a weakly decreasing
function of r, this expression equals wk(rj −1, 1). Similarly, for each i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, each
member in Di \D1 may receive at most wk(rj − i+ 2, 1). Therefore the total change in
the group balance after the k turns is:
∆[Balance] ≥
∑
j∈D1
k∑
i=2
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1) −
k∑
i=2
∑
j∈Di\D1
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1)
=
k∑
i=2

∑
j∈D1
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1) −
∑
j∈Di\D1
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1)

 . (4)
Now, the group chose g1 while g2, . . . , gk were still available, which means that the
total weight of g1 is weakly larger than the total weight of each of the other goods:
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , k} :
∑
j∈D1
wk(rj , 1) ≥
∑
j∈Di
wk(rj , 1) ≥
∑
j∈Di\D1
wk(rj , 1).
By the expression for wk, for every i, wk(rj − i + 2, 1) = wk(rj , 1) · Li−2k . Therefore∑
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1) = Li−2k ·
∑
wk(rj , 1), so the above inequality implies:
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , k} :
∑
j∈D1
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1) ≥
∑
j∈Di\D1
wk(rj − i+ 2, 1).
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Substituting this in (4) implies that ∆[Balance] ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.11 is still true as-is in our case: When the RWAV protocol ends, the balance
of each group equals the number of its happy members. The proof is the same: when the
protocol ends, all happy members have r = 0, s = 0 so by Lemma 5.10 their balance is
−Bk(0, 0) = −1, and all unhappy members have r = 0, s = 1 so by Lemma 5.10 their
balance is −Bk(0, 1) = 0. The group balance is the negative of the sum of its members’
balances, which is exactly the number of happy members.
The analogue of Lemma 3.6 is:
Lemma 5.12. Let c ≥ 2 be a constant. Suppose there are k ≥ 2 groups with additive
valuations. Then, the RWAV protocol yields an allocation that is 1-of-best-c for at least
a fraction Bk(c− i+ 1, 1) of the members in group i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that each agent values his c best goods at 1
and the other goods at 0. So for each agent we have r = c and s = 1.
For i > c, the value of Bk(c− i+1, 1) is non-positive and the statement holds trivially,
so we may assume that i ≤ c. At the first turn of group i, each of its members has at
least c− i+ 1 desired goods, so the group balance is at least Bk(c− i+ 1, 1) · ni. From
then on, by Lemma 5.11, the group balance weakly increases, so the final balance is at
least Bk(c− i+ 1, 1) · ni. By Lemma 3.11, the final number of happy agents is at least
Bk(c− i+ 1, 1) · ni.
The analogue of Theorem 3.14 follows by substituting the expression for Bk:
Theorem 5.13. For every c ≥ k, RWAV can guarantee 1-of-best-c fairness to at least
1− 1/(Lk)c−k+1 of the members in all groups.
An interesting special case is when c = k, since 1-of-best-k fairness is equivalent to
positive-MMS fairness. Theorem 5.13 guarantees this for 1−1/Lk = 1−2−1/(k−1) of the
agents; this ratio approaches 0 for large k. However, by enhancing the RWAV protocol
analogously to Theorem 3.17, we can guarantee 1-of-best-k fairness to a constant fraction
of the agents:
Theorem 5.14. For k groups with additive agents, a 1/3-democratic 1-of-best-k alloca-
tion (which implies 1/3-democratic positive-MMS) exists and can be found efficiently.
Proof. We convert all valuations to binary by assuming that each agent desires only
his/her k best goods (breaking ties arbitrarily). We prove that it is possible to give at
least 1/3 of the agents in each group at least one desired good.
The proof is by induction on k. For k = 2 we already proved in Theorem 3.17 that it
is possible to guarantee 1-of-best-2 to at least 3/5 of the agents in each group. Assume
the claim is true up until k − 1; we will prove it for k.
If in some group i at least ni/3 members desire the same good g, give them good g
and divide the remaining goods among the remaining groups recursively. Note that in
each remaining group, every agent now desires at least k − 1 goods, so by the inductive
hypothesis, it is possible to satisfy at least a 1/3 fraction of each group.
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Otherwise, run RWAV modified for k groups as explained above. As in the proof of
Lemma 5.12, it is sufficient to prove that, for each group i, its balance when it first picks
an item is at least ni/3.
The initial payment of each member is Bk(k, 1) = 1− 1/2k/(k−1) > 1/2, so the initial
amount paid to each group i is more than ni/2. This is also the balance of group 1 when
it first picks a good.
The balance of groups 2, 3, . . . , k is smaller since they have to pay to their members
whose desired goods were picked. Obviously group k is in the worst situation since it
has to pay k− 1 times, so we focus on this group. Each time a good is picked, the group
has to pay to at most nk/3 members. It has to pay wk(r, 1) to each member with r
remaining goods. Recall that wk(r, 1) is larger when r is smaller. Therefore, the worst
case for group k is when it has to pay again and again to the same nk/3 members. In
this case it has to pay nk/3 ·
∑k
r=2 wk(r, 1) = nk/3 · [Bk(k, 1) − Bk(1, 1)]. The total
balance remaining in group k’s account when it first picks a good is thus at least:
Bk(k, 1) · nk − nk/3 · [Bk(k, 1) −Bk(1, 1)] > Bk(k, 1) · 2nk/3
> (1/2) · 2nk/3 = nk/3.
This concludes the proof.
Remark 5.15. By Proposition 5.1, the asymptotic upper bound on h when k → ∞
is 1/2.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
For two groups, we have a comprehensive understanding of possible democratic fairness
guarantees. We have a complete characterization of possible envy-freeness approxima-
tions, and upper and lower bounds for maximin-share-fairness approximations. Some
remaining gaps are shown in Table 1; closing them raises interesting combinatorial chal-
lenges.
For k ≥ 3 groups, the challenges are much greater. Currently all our fairness guaran-
tees are to no more than 1/3 of the agents in each group. From a practical perspective,
it may be important in some settings to give fairness guarantees to at least half of the
agents in all groups. Finding protocols that provide such guarantees is an avenue for fu-
ture work. In addition, our work leaves open the question of whether a stronger fairness
notion than 1-of-best-k can be guaranteed for a fraction of the agents in each group if
we do not allow the fraction to decrease as the number of groups grows. From an algo-
rithmic perspective, it is interesting whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that guarantees EF1 to any positive fraction of the agents.
A possible concern about democratic fairness is that it completely leaves aside a frac-
tion of the agents in each group. As Proposition 3.1 shows, it might be inevitable to
leave some agents with zero utility. In these cases, the goal of an egalitarianist is to min-
imize the fraction of such poor agents. While the weighting scheme used by our RWAV
protocol indeed prioritizes the interests of poor agents (see Example 3.15), it may be
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interesting to develop an algorithm that directly minimizes the maximum fraction of
poor agents across all groups.
We end the paper with a number of additional directions for future work.
• Our democratic fairness notion treats all groups equally regardless of their size.
This may lead to situations where a large group has to sacrifice a significant amount
of utility in order to preserve the fairness for a small group. How do the fairness
guarantees change if we let the required fraction depend on the size of the group?
• In several domains, including voting and preference elication, restricting the pref-
erences of the agents is a common approach for circumventing negative results
[Elkind et al., 2017]. Our group fair division setting opens up the possibility of
imposing the same kind of conditions, for example by assuming that agents in
the same group have single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. Is it possible to
obtain stronger fairness guarantees if these conditions are satisfied?
• We have not addressed the issue of efficiency in this paper beyond the assumption
that all goods must be allocated. In individual fair division, it is known that EF1
and Pareto optimality are compatible [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. Can we similarly
strengthen Theorem 4.2 by adding Pareto optimality? For binary valuations this
is indeed possible since any Pareto improvement preserves EF1, but the question
remains open for additive and general valuations.
A. Properties of the Function B
The function B(r, s), defined in Section 3.2, represents a lower bound on the fraction
of agents that can be given at least s out of r desired goods. It is defined using the
following recurrence relation (1):
B(r, s) :=


1 s ≤ 0;
0 0 < s and r < s;
min
[
1
2 [B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1)], B(r − 2, s − 1)
]
otherwise.
Some values are shown in Table 3. In this section we prove several properties of B.
Lemma A.1. For every fixed r, B(r, s) is a weakly decreasing function of s.
Proof. By induction on r. For r = 0, 1, 2, 3 this is apparent from Table 3 (there are
finitely many values to check). Now let r ≥ 4. We assume the claim is true for r− 2 and
r − 1 and prove it is true for r.
B(r, s) is a minimum of two expressions. In each of these expressions, the first operand
is less than r. Therefore, by the induction assumption, each of these expressions is
decreasing with s. Therefore the same is true for B(r, s).
Lemma A.2. For every fixed s, B(r, s) is a weakly increasing function of r.
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Proof. We have to prove that, for every s and every r ≥ 1, B(r, s) ≥ B(r − 1, s). We
prove this by induction on r. For r = 1, 2, 3 this is apparent from Table 3 (there are
finitely many values to check). Now let r ≥ 4. We assume the claim is true for r− 2 and
r − 1 and prove it is true for r. By the induction assumption, each term in the formula
of B(r, s) in (1) is no less than the corresponding term in the formula of B(r − 1, s).
Hence it follows that B(r, s) ≥ B(r − 1, s).
Lemma A.3. For every r, s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ r, 0 ≤ B(r, s) ≤ 1.
Proof. The boundary conditions on B imply that, for every r, B(r, 0) = 1 and B(r, r +
1) = 0. Lemma A.1 implies that, for every fixed r, B(r, s) decreases from 1 to 0.
Lemma A.4. For every r, s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ r, 0 ≤ w(r, s) ≤ 1.
Proof. By definition of w, w(r, s) = B(r, s)−B(r− 1, s). By Lemma A.2, this difference
is at least 0. By Lemma A.3, the difference is at most 1.
Lemma A.5. For every s ≥ 1 and every r ≤ 2s − 2:
B(r, s) = 0.
Proof. By induction on s. When s = 1, the claim should be verified only for r = 0;
indeed it is true by the boundary condition B(0, 1) = 0.
Assume that s ≥ 2 and that the claim is true for s− 1. Let r be an integer such that
r ≤ 2s− 2. By the recurrence relation defining B:
B(r, s) ≤ B(r − 2, s− 1).
Since r ≤ 2s − 2, r − 2 ≤ 2(s − 1) − 2. Hence by the induction assumption on s − 1:
B(r − 2, s − 1) = 0, so B(r, s) ≤ 0. But by Lemma A.3, B(r, s) ≥ 0, so we must have
B(r, s) = 0.
Lemma A.6. For every s ≥ 1 and every r ≥ 2s − 1:
B(r, s) =
1
2
[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)].
Proof. By the recurrence relation (1), it is sufficient to prove that whenever r ≥ 2s− 1:
B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1) − 2B(r − 2, s − 1) ≤ 0.
We prove this by induction on r. For r = 1 and r = 2 we only have to check the case
s = 1; indeed the claim can be verified in Table 3. Assume that r > 2 and that the
claim holds for r − 1 and r − 2. We prove that it holds for r by considering two cases.
Case A: r = 2s − 1. Then, by Lemma A.5, B(r − 1, s) = 0. However, B(r − 1, s − 1)
and B(r − 2, s − 1) are subject to the induction assumption, since r − 1 ≥ 2(s − 1)− 1
and r − 2 ≥ 2(s − 1)− 1. Hence:
B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1)− 2B(r − 2, s − 1)
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= 0 +
1
2
[B(r − 2, s− 1) +B(r − 2, s− 2)] − [B(r − 3, s − 1) +B(r − 3, s − 2)]
=
1
2
[B(r − 2, s − 1) +B(r − 2, s − 2)− 2B(r − 3, s− 2)] (since B(r − 3, s − 1) = 0)
≤ 0 (by the induction assumption on r − 1, since r − 1 ≥ 2(s− 1)− 1).
Case B : r ≥ 2s. Then, all three terms in the inequality are subject to the induction
assumption. Hence:
B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1)− 2B(r − 2, s− 1)
=
1
2
[B(r − 2, s) +B(r − 2, s − 1) +B(r − 2, s − 1) +B(r − 2, s − 2)]
− [B(r − 3, s − 1) +B(r − 3, s − 2)]
=
1
2
[B(r − 2, s) +B(r − 2, s − 1)− 2B(r − 3, s − 1)]
+
1
2
[B(r − 2, s− 1) +B(r − 2, s− 2)− 2B(r − 3, s − 2)]
≤ 0 (by the induction assumption on r − 1, since r − 1 ≥ 2s− 1).
In light of Lemma A.6, the recurrence relation (1) can be simplified to:
B(r, s) :=


1 s ≤ 0;
0 0 < s and r ≤ 2s− 2;
1
2 [B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1)] 0 < s and r ≥ 2s− 1.
(5)
In the next lemma we find a closed-form solution to the function B in (5):
Lemma A.7. The following function satisfies the recurrence relation (5):
B(r, s) =
1
2r
r−s∑
i=s−1
(
r
i
)
=
1
2r
r−s+1∑
i=s
(
r
i
)
,
where we assume that
(
a
b
)
= 0 if b < 0 or b > a.
Proof. When s = 0, the sum goes from −1 to r, however, for i = −1 the summand is
zero so B(r, s) = 12r
∑r
i=0
(r
i
)
= 1.
When r ≤ 2s− 2, the sum starts at s− 1 and ends at (at most) s− 2 so it is 0.
When r ≥ 2s− 1, it is sufficient to prove that 2r−1B(r− 1, s) + 2r−1B(r− 1, s− 1) =
2rB(r, s). We have
2r−1B(r − 1, s) =
r−s−1∑
i=s−1
(
r − 1
i
)
, and
2r−1B(r − 1, s − 1) =
r−s∑
i=s−2
(
r − 1
i
)
=
r−s+1∑
i=s−1
(
r − 1
i− 1
)
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=r−s−1∑
i=s−1
(
r − 1
i− 1
)
+
[(
r − 1
r − s− 1
)
+
(
r − 1
r − s
)]
,
since when r ≥ 2s − 1, the sum ∑r−s+1i=s−1 (r−1i−1) contains at least two elements. Summing
the above two equations gives:
2r−1[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s− 1)]
=
r−s−1∑
i=s−1
[(
r − 1
i
)
+
(
r − 1
i− 1
)]
+
[(
r − 1
r − s− 1
)
+
(
r − 1
r − s
)]
By two applications of Pascal’s identity:
2r−1[B(r − 1, s) +B(r − 1, s − 1)] =
r−s−1∑
i=s−1
(
r
i
)
+
(
r
r − s
)
=
r−s∑
i=s−1
(
r
i
)
= 2rB(r, s).
Next, we prove several technical lemmas about binomial coefficients and their sums.
Lemma A.8. For every s ≥ 1:(
3s − 1
s− 1
)
3s
s+ 2
≤ 23s−3.
Proof. By induction on s. For s = 1, 2, 3, 4 the claim can be verified manually. We
assume the claim for some s ≥ 4 and prove it for s + 1. When s grows to s + 1, the
right-hand side is multiplied by 8. The left-hand side is multiplied by:[(
3s + 2
s
)
3s+ 3
s+ 3
]/[(
3s − 1
s− 1
)
3s
s+ 2
]
=
(3s + 2)!(3s + 3)(s − 1)!(2s)!(s + 2)
(s)!(2s + 2)!(s + 3)(3s − 1)!(3s)
=
(3s + 2)(3s + 1)(3s)(3s + 3)(s + 2)
(s)(2s + 2)(2s + 1)(s + 3)(3s)
=
3(3s + 2)(3s + 1)(s + 2)
2(s)(2s + 1)(s + 3)
≤ 3 · 3 · (3s + 2)
2 · 2 · (s) = 2.25 · (3 + 2/s).
When s ≥ 4 this expression is less than 8, so the left-hand side remains smaller than the
right-hand side.
Lemma A.9. For every s ≥ 1:
s−1∑
i=0
(
3s− 1
i
)
+
s−2∑
i=0
(
3s− 1
i
)
≤ 23s−3.
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Proof. For N ≥ 2k, denote by f(N, k) the sum of the first k binomial coefficients:
f(N, k) :=
∑k
i=0
(N
k
)
. Michael Lugo proved the following upper bound on this sum:15
f(N, k) ≤
(
N
k
)
N − k + 1
N − 2k + 1 .
Therefore:
f(N, k + 1) + f(N, k) = 2f(N, k + 1)−
(
N
k + 1
)
≤
(
N
k + 1
)[
2 · N − k
N − 2k − 1 − 1
]
=
(
N
k + 1
)
N + 1
N − 2k − 1 .
The left-hand side of the claim is this expression with N = 3s − 1 and k = s − 2, so it
is no more than: (
3s− 1
s− 1
)
3s
3s− 1− 2s+ 4− 1 =
(
3s− 1
s− 1
)
3s
s+ 2
,
which by Lemma A.8 is at most 23s−3.
Our next lemma is a generalization of Lemma A.9.16
Lemma A.10. For all integers c ≥ 3 and s ≥ 1:
s−1∑
i=0
(
cs− 1
i
)
+
s−2∑
i=0
(
cs− 1
i
)
≤ 2cs−c.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on c for every fixed s. For c = 3, the inequality
follows from Lemma A.9. We now assume the claim is true for some c ≥ 3. When c grows
to c+ 1, the left-hand side still has the same number of summands (2s− 3 summands),
where in each summand, the cs− 1 at the top becomes cs+ s− 1. Meanwhile, the right-
hand side is multiplied by 2s−1. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that in the left-hand
side, each summand grows by a factor of at most 2s−1. Indeed, for every i ≤ s− 1:(
cs+s−1
i
)
(cs−1
i
) = (cs + s− 1)!/(cs + s− 1− i)!
(cs− 1)!/(cs − 1− i)!
=
(cs + s− 1) · · · (cs + s− i)
(cs− 1) · · · (cs − i)
=
(
1 +
s
cs − 1
)
· · ·
(
1 +
s
cs− i
)
15 Here: https://mathoverflow.net/a/17236/34461
16 We are grateful to Alex Francisco and Y. Forman for their help in proving this lemma here:
https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2604279/29780
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≤
(
1 +
s
cs − i
)i
(the rightmost term is the largest)
≤
(
1 +
s
cs − (s− 1)
)s−1
(i ≤ s− 1)
<
(
1 +
s
2s − s+ 1
)s−1
(c > 2)
< 2s−1.
This completes the proof.
We now use this combinatorial lemma to prove a useful lower bound on B(r, s), which
implies a democratic fairness guarantee.
Lemma A.11. For every c ≥ 3 and s ≥ 2:
B(cs− 1, s) ≥ 1− 1/2c−1.
Therefore, RWAV attains (1− 1/2c−1)-democratic 1-out-of-c MMS-fairness.
Proof. Using the closed form for B(r, s) from Lemma A.7, we have to prove that:
1
2cs−1
cs−s∑
i=s
(
cs− 1
i
)
≥ 1− 1
2c−1
⇐⇒ 1
2cs−1
[
s−1∑
i=0
(
cs− 1
i
)
+
cs−1∑
i=cs−s+1
(
cs − 1
i
)]
≤ 1
2c−1
⇐⇒
s−1∑
i=0
(
cs− 1
i
)
+
cs−1∑
i=cs−s+1
(
cs − 1
i
)
≤ 2cs−c
⇐⇒
s−1∑
i=0
(
cs− 1
i
)
+
s−2∑
i=0
(
cs− 1
i
)
≤ 2cs−c,
which we already proved in Lemma A.10.
B. Sample Runs of Some Protocols
Below we present sample runs of some of our allocation protocols. The source code used
for the samples is available at: https://github.com/erelsgl/family-fair-allocation.
B.1. RWAV protocol
Below are sample runs of the RWAV protocol (Section 3.2) on an instance with five
goods and two families with different fairness criteria.
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Group 1 seeks 1-out-of-2-maximin-share and has:
* 2 binary agents who want [’v’, ’x’]
* 1 binary agent who want [’v’, ’x’, ’y’]
* 5 binary agents who want [’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]
* 3 binary agents who want [’w’, ’z’]
Group 2 seeks one-of-best-2 and has:
* 2 binary agents who want [’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]
* 3 binary agents who want [’v’, ’z’]
-------
RWAV protocol - Group 1 plays first
Turn #1: Group 1’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members v,x 2 1 0.25
1 member v,x,y 3 1 0.125
5 members w,x,y,z 4 2 0.25
3 members w,z 2 1 0.25
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
z 2.0
v 0.625
y 1.375
x 1.875
w 2.0
Group 1 picks w
Turn #2: Group 2’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members w,x,y,z 3 1 0.125
3 members v,z 2 1 0.25
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
z 1.0
v 0.75
y 0.25
x 0.25
Group 2 picks z
Turn #3: Group 1’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’x’, ’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
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Desired set r s weight
2 members v,x 2 1 0.25
1 member v,x,y 3 1 0.125
5 members w,x,y,z 2 1 0.25
3 members w,z 0 0 0
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
v 0.625
y 1.375
x 1.875
Group 1 picks x
Turn #4: Group 2’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members w,x,y,z 1 0 0
3 members v,z 1 0 0
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
v 0
y 0
Group 2 picks v
Turn #5: Group 1’s turn to pick a good from [’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members v,x 0 0 0
1 member v,x,y 1 0 0
5 members w,x,y,z 1 0 0
3 members w,z 0 0 0
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
y 0
Group 1 picks y
Final allocation:
* Group 1: allocated bundle = {’y’, ’x’, ’w’}, happy members = 11/11
* Group 2: allocated bundle = {’v’, ’z’}, happy members = 5/5
-------
RWAV protocol - Group 2 plays first
Turn #1: Group 2’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
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Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members w,x,y,z 4 1 0.0625
3 members v,z 2 1 0.25
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
z 0.875
v 0.75
y 0.125
x 0.125
w 0.125
Group 2 picks z
Turn #2: Group 1’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members v,x 2 1 0.25
1 member v,x,y 3 1 0.125
5 members w,x,y,z 3 2 0.375
3 members w,z 1 1 0.5
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
v 0.625
y 2.0
x 2.5
w 3.375
Group 1 picks w
Turn #3: Group 2’s turn to pick a good from [’v’, ’x’, ’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members w,x,y,z 2 0 0
3 members v,z 1 0 0
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
v 0
y 0
x 0
Group 2 picks v
Turn #4: Group 1’s turn to pick a good from [’x’, ’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members v,x 1 1 0.5
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1 member v,x,y 2 1 0.25
5 members w,x,y,z 2 1 0.25
3 members w,z 0 0 0
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
y 1.5
x 2.5
Group 1 picks x
Turn #5: Group 2’s turn to pick a good from [’y’]:
Calculating member weights:
Desired set r s weight
2 members w,x,y,z 1 0 0
3 members v,z 0 -1 0
Calculating remaining good weights:
Weight
y 0
Group 2 picks y
Final allocation:
* Group 2: allocated bundle = {’v’, ’z’, ’y’}, happy members = 5/5
* Group 1: allocated bundle = {’x’, ’w’}, happy members = 11/11
B.2. Line-allocation protocol for two groups
Below are three sample runs of the line-allocation algorithm of Theorem 4.2, on an
instance with six goods and two families, where the fairness criterion is EF1.
Group 1 seeks envy-free-except-1 and has:
* 7 agents with additive valuations: u=1 v=1 w=2 x=4 y=8 z=16
* 2 agents with additive valuations: u=16 v=16 w=8 x=4 y=2 z=1
Group 2 seeks envy-free-except-1 and has:
* 5 agents with additive valuations: u=1 v=1 w=1 x=3 y=3 z=4
* 1 agent with additive valuations: u=4 v=4 w=3 x=1 y=3 z=1
Group 3 seeks envy-free-except-1 and has:
* 9 agents with additive valuations: u=1 v=1 w=1 x=2 y=3 z=3
* 3 agents with additive valuations: u=3 v=3 w=3 x=2 y=1 z=1
----- Allocation between group 1 and group 2 -----
Current partition: [] | [’u’, ’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 0/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
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Group 2: 0/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’] | [’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 2: 0/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’] | [’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 2: 1/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’, ’w’] | [’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 2: 1/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’, ’w’, ’x’] | [’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 9/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 1 gets the left bundle
Group 2 gets the remaining bundle
Final allocation:
* Group 1: allocated bundle = {’u’, ’w’, ’x’, ’v’}, happy members = 9/9
* Group 2: allocated bundle = {’y’, ’z’}, happy members = 5/6
----- Allocation between group 1 and group 3 -----
Current partition: [] | [’u’, ’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 0/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 3: 0/12 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’] | [’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 3: 0/12 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’] | [’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 3: 3/12 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’, ’w’] | [’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 3: 3/12 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’, ’w’, ’x’] | [’y’, ’z’]:
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Group 1: 9/9 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 1 gets the left bundle
Group 3 gets the remaining bundle
Final allocation:
* Group 1: allocated bundle = {’u’, ’w’, ’x’, ’v’}, happy members = 9/9
* Group 3: allocated bundle = {’y’, ’z’}, happy members = 9/12
----- Allocation between group 2 and group 3 -----
Current partition: [] | [’z’, ’y’, ’x’, ’w’, ’v’, ’u’]:
Group 2: 0/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 3: 0/12 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’z’] | [’y’, ’x’, ’w’, ’v’, ’u’]:
Group 2: 0/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 3: 0/12 members think the left bundle is EF1
Current partition: [’z’, ’y’] | [’x’, ’w’, ’v’, ’u’]:
Group 2: 5/6 members think the left bundle is EF1
Group 2 gets the left bundle
Group 3 gets the remaining bundle
Final allocation:
* Group 2: allocated bundle = {’y’, ’z’}, happy members = 5/6
* Group 3: allocated bundle = {’v’, ’u’, ’w’, ’x’}, happy members = 12/12
B.3. Line-allocation protocol for three groups
Below is a sample run of the line-allocation algorithm of Theorem 5.9, on an instance
with six goods and three families, where the fairness criterion is PROP∗2.
Group 1 seeks proportionality-except-2 and has:
* 7 agents with additive valuations: u=1 v=1 w=2 x=4 y=8 z=16
* 2 agents with additive valuations: u=16 v=16 w=8 x=4 y=2 z=1
Group 2 seeks proportionality-except-2 and has:
* 5 agents with additive valuations: u=1 v=1 w=1 x=3 y=3 z=4
* 1 agent with additive valuations: u=4 v=4 w=3 x=1 y=3 z=1
Group 3 seeks proportionality-except-2 and has:
* 9 agents with additive valuations: u=1 v=1 w=1 x=2 y=3 z=3
* 3 agents with additive valuations: u=3 v=3 w=3 x=2 y=1 z=1
Current partition: [] | [’u’, ’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
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Group 1: 0/9 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 2: 0/6 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 3: 0/12 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Current partition: [’u’] | [’v’, ’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 2: 1/6 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 3: 3/12 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Current partition: [’u’, ’v’] | [’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 2: 6/6 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 2 gets the left bundle
Current partition: [] | [’w’, ’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 0/9 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 3: 0/12 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Current partition: [’w’] | [’x’, ’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 2/9 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 3: 3/12 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Current partition: [’w’, ’x’] | [’y’, ’z’]:
Group 1: 9/9 members think the left bundle is PROP-2
Group 1 gets the left bundle
Group 3 gets the remaining bundle
Final allocation:
* Group 1: allocated bundle = {’x’, ’w’}, happy members = 9/9
* Group 2: allocated bundle = {’v’, ’u’}, happy members = 6/6
* Group 3: allocated bundle = {’y’, ’z’}, happy members = 9/12
C. A Randomized Algorithm
While our main focus in this paper is on deterministic algorithms, it is interesting that
we can obtain better democratic fairness guarantees by using a randomized algorithm.
For simplicity, we illustrate this for two groups.
Instead of the RWAV protocol of Section 3.2, we define a protocol called Coin-toss
with Weighted Approval Voting (CWAV) as follows:
While there are remaining goods:
• Pick i ∈ {1, 2} uniformly at random.
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• Group i picks a good.
Each group picks its good using a weighted-approval scheme where the weights are
defined by:
C(r, s) :=


1 s ≤ 0;
0 0 < s and r < s;
1
2 [C(r − 1, s) + C(r − 1, s − 1)] otherwise.
w(r, s) := C(r, s)− C(r − 1, s).
CWAV is analyzed similarly to RWAV, by adding fiat payments. For simplicity we
call the groups 1 and −1.
• Initially, each member j pays C(rj , sj) to its group;
• After group i picks a good g, every member j of i who wants g pays w(rj , sj) to
group i;
• After group −i picks a good g, every member j of i who wants g receives w(rj , sj)
from group i.
Similarly to Lemma 3.9, it is easy to show that the balance of each agent j is always
−C(rj, sj). Instead of Lemma 3.10, we have:
Lemma C.1. In each turn, the expected change in the balance of each group i is weakly
positive.
Proof. Suppose that, if group i wins the coin-toss it picks a good gi, while if group −i
wins it picks a good g−i. The change in the balance of group i is determined by its
following subsets (not necessarily disjoint):
• Di: members of group i who desire gi.
• D−i: members of group i who desire g−i.
With probability 1/2, group i wins the coin-toss, picks gi, and receives w(rj , sj) from
each member in Di. With probability 1/2, group i loses the coin-toss and has to pay
w(rj , sj) to each member in D−i. Therefore the expected change in the group balance
after one turn is:
E[∆[Balance]] =
1
2
[ ∑
j∈Di
w(rj , sj)−
∑
j∈D−i
w(rj , sj)
]
.
Since the group chose gi over g−i, the total weight of gi is weakly larger, so the expected
change in balance is ≥ 0.
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r ↓ s =⇒ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0.875 0.5 0.125 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0.938 0.688 0.313 0.063 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0.969 0.813 0.501 0.188 0.032 0 0 0 0
6 1 0.985 0.891 0.657 0.345 0.11 0.016 0 0 0
7 1 0.993 0.938 0.774 0.501 0.228 0.063 0.008 0 0
8 1 0.997 0.966 0.856 0.638 0.365 0.146 0.036 0.004 0
9 1 0.999 0.982 0.911 0.747 0.502 0.256 0.091 0.02 0.002
10 1 1 0.991 0.947 0.829 0.625 0.379 0.174 0.056 0.011
Table 4: Some values of C(r, s). Compare to MaxH(r, s) in Table 2 and B(r, s) in
Table 3.
Similarly to Lemma 3.11, it is easy to show that, when the protocol ends, the group
balance equals the number of its happy members. Instead of Lemma 3.6 we have:
Lemma C.2. Given a fairness criterion represented by an integer function s(r), the
RWAV protocol yields an allocation that is fair for at least a fraction h of the agents in
each group, where:
h = inf
r=1,2,...
C(r, s(r)).
Proof. The initial balance in each group i is at least h ·ni. By Lemma C.1, the expected
value of the balance-increase after each coin-toss is weakly positive. Since the coin-toss
in each turn is independent of the other turns, the expected balance after the last turn
is weakly larger than in the first turn. The balance after the last turn equals the number
of happy agents.
Some values of C(r, s) are shown in Table 4. By solving the recurrence relation we
can express C(r, s) as:
C(r, s) =
1
2r
r∑
i=s
(
r
i
)
.
Note that this is the same as the function MaxH of Proposition 3.2, except the part
where r ≤ 2s − 1, for which MaxH = 0 but CWAV attains a positive fraction in
expectation (Obviously, with a randomized protocol we can always attain an expected
fraction of 1/2 by simply giving all goods to a group chosen uniformly at random, so the
range where C(r, s) ≤ 1/2 is not interesting).
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D. Proof of Theorem 5.7
In this section we prove Theorem 5.7: For k groups in which all agents have binary
valuations, there exists an allocation that is 1/k-democratic EF1, PROP∗(k − 1) and
MMS-fair.
To establish this theorem, we prove two lemmas that may be of independent interest—
one on cake-cutting and the other on group allocation for agents with additive valuations.
The result on cake-cutting generalizes the theorems of Stromquist [1980] and Su [1999],
who prove the existence of contiguous envy-free cake allocations for individual agents.
Since these results are well-known, we present the model and proof quite briefly, focusing
on the changes required to generalize from individuals to groups.
We consider a “cake” modeled as the interval [0, 1]. Each agent aij has a value-density
function vij : [0, 1]→ R≥0. The value of an agent for a pieceX is Vij(X) =
∫
x∈X vij(x)dx.
Denoting by Xi the allocation to group i, an allocation is envy-free for an agent aij if
Vij(Xi) ≥ Vij(Xi′) for every group i′. A contiguous allocation is an allocation of the cake
in which each group gets a contiguous interval.
Lemma D.1. There always exists a contiguous cake allocation that is 1/k-democratic
envy-free. The factor 1/k is tight.
Proof. The space of all contiguous partitions corresponds to the standard simplex in
R
k. Triangulate that simplex and assign each vertex of the triangulation to one of the
groups. In each vertex, ask the group owning that vertex to select one of the k pieces us-
ing plurality voting among its members, breaking ties arbitrarily. Label that vertex with
the group’s selection. The resulting labeling satisfies the conditions of Sperner’s lemma
(see Su [1999]). Therefore, the triangulation has a Sperner subsimplex—a subsimplex
all of whose labels are different. We can repeat this process with finer and finer trian-
gulations. This gives an infinite sequence of smaller and smaller Sperner subsimplices.
This sequence has a subsequence that converges to a single point. By the continuity
of preferences, this limit point corresponds to a partition in which each group selects
a different piece. Since the selection is by plurality, at least 1/k of the agents in each
group prefer their group’s piece over all other pieces.
The tightness of the 1/k factor follows from Lemma 6 of Segal-Halevi and Nitzan
[2015]. It shows an example with k groups and n′ agents in each group with the property
that in order to give a positive value to q out of n′ agents in each group, we need to
cut the cake into at least k(kq − n′)/(k − 1) intervals. In a contiguous partition there
are exactly k intervals. Therefore, the fraction of agents in each group that can be
guaranteed a positive value is q/n′ ≤ 1/k + 1/n′ − 1/kn′. Since n′ can be arbitrarily
large, the largest fraction that can be guaranteed is 1/k.
The next lemma presents a reduction from approximate envy-free allocation of indi-
visible goods to envy-free cake-cutting. We call this approximation “EF-minus-2”. For
any agent aij, denote by uij,max := maxg∈G uij(g) the maximum utility of the agent
for any single good. An allocation is EF-minus-2 for agent aij if for every group i
′,
uij(Gi) > uij(Gi′) − 2uij,max. The reduction generalizes Theorem 5 of Suksompong
[2019]; a similar reduction was used in Theorem 3 of Barrera et al. [2015].
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Lemma D.2. When agents have additive valuations, there always exists a contiguous
allocation of indivisible goods that is 1/k-democratic EF-minus-2.
Proof. We create an instance of the cake-cutting problem in the following way.
• The cake is the half-open interval (0,m].
• The value-density functions are piecewise constant: for every l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the
value-density vij in the half-open interval (l − 1, l] equals uij(gl).
By Lemma D.1, there exists a contiguous cake allocation that is envy-free for at least
1/k of the agents in each group. From this allocation we construct an allocation of goods
as follows.
• If point g of the cake is in the interior of a piece, then good g is given to the group
owning that piece.
• If point g of the cake is at the boundary between two pieces, then good g is given
to the group owning the piece to its left.
A group gets good g only if it owns a positive fraction of the interval (g−1, g]. Hence, in
the allocation, each group loses strictly less than the value of a good and gains strictly
less than the value of a good (relative to its value in the cake division). This means
that every agent who believes that the cake allocation is envy-free also believes that the
goods allocation is EF-minus-2.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.7.
Proof of Theorem 5.7. Suppose an allocation is EF-minus-2 for some agent aij . This
means that the agent’s envy towards any other group is less than 2uij,max ≤ 2. Since the
agent has binary valuations, the envy is at most 1, meaning that the allocation is EF1
for that agent. Hence any 1/k-democratic EF-minus-2 allocation, which is guaranteed to
exist by Lemma D.2, is also 1/k-democratic EF1. By Lemma 2.3 it is also 1/k-democratic
PROP∗(k − 1). By Lemma 2.7 it is also 1/k-democratic MMS-fair.
The cake-cutting protocol of Lemma D.1 might take infinitely many steps to converge.
In fact, there is no finite protocol for contiguous envy-free cake-cutting even for individ-
uals [Stromquist, 2008]. However, the division guaranteed by Lemma D.2 and Theorem
5.7 can be found in finite time (exponential in the input size) by checking all possible
allocations. An interesting open question is whether a faster algorithm exists.
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